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Th e Committee for Economic Development is an 
independent research and policy organization of over 
200 business leaders and educators. CED is non-
proﬁ t, non-partisan, and non-political. Its purpose is 
to propose policies that bring about steady economic 
growth at high employment and reasonably stable 
prices, increased productivity and living standards, 
greater and more equal opportunity for every citizen, 
and an improved quality of life for all.
All CED policy recommendations must have the ap-
proval of trustees on the Policy and Impact Committee. 
Th is committee is directed under the bylaws, which 
emphasize that “all research is to be thoroughly objec-
tive in character, and the approach in each instance is to 
be from the standpoint of the general welfare and not 
from that of any special political or economic group.” 
Th e committee is aided by a Research Advisory Board 
of leading social scientists and by a small permanent 
professional staﬀ .
Th e Policy and Impact Committee does not attempt 
to pass judgment on any pending speciﬁ c legislative 
proposals; its purpose is to urge careful consideration 
of the objectives set forth in this statement and of the 
best means of accomplishing those objectives.
Each statement is preceded by extensive discussions, 
meetings, and exchange of memoranda. Th e research 
is undertaken by a subcommittee, assisted by advisors 
chosen for their competence in the ﬁ eld under study. 
Th e full Policy and Impact Committee participates in 
the drafting of recommendations. Likewise, the trust-
ees on the drafting subcommittee vote to approve or 
disapprove a policy statement, and they share with the 
Policy and Impact Committee the privilege of submit-
ting individual comments for publication.
Th e recommendations presented herein are those of the 
trustee members of the Policy and Impact Committee and 
the responsible subcommittee. Th ey are not necessarily 
endorsed by other trustees or by non-trustee subcommittee 
members, advisors, contributors, staﬀ  members, or others 
associated with CED.
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Purpose of this Statement
Th ere is no more important task facing the United 
States than providing a high-quality education for all 
children.  Th e nation’s economic future depends on 
employers’ ability to ﬁ nd qualiﬁ ed workers to ﬁ ll the 
increasingly demanding jobs that oﬀ er good wages in a 
global 21st century marketplace.  So, too, the quality of 
our civic and social life rests on equipping every indi-
vidual with the knowledge and skills to be an informed 
and engaged participant.
Th is challenge is increasingly being recognized as a 
human capital challenge:  recruiting, developing, and 
retaining highly eﬀ ective teachers who can help all 
students learn.  Until recently, education reformers have 
given insuﬃ  cient attention to the policies that aﬀ ect 
how teaching talent is acquired, increased, and sus-
tained and of the need for these policies to be managed 
strategically in support of educational objectives.   
Mounting evidence demonstrates that high-quality 
teaching is crucial for raising student achievement 
levels.  Staﬃ  ng the nation’s schools with high-quality 
teachers means that traditional human capital policies 
need to change. 
CED Trustees were drawn to the subject of human 
capital policy in K-12 education because we knew from 
our own experiences leading businesses and postsec-
ondary institutions how crucial talented employees are 
to the success of our enterprises.  We also recognized 
that human capital policies (including, in public educa-
tion, such things as pre-service training, hiring, assign-
ments, mentoring, professional development, compen-
sation, working conditions, and retention/dismissal 
policies) are interconnected and must be addressed in a 
systemic way in order to align them eﬀ ectively with an 
organization’s goals.
We strongly support eﬀ orts aimed at achieving coor-
dinated reforms across the human capital landscape.  
For our part, we have chosen in our current study to 
investigate in depth the compensation component.  We 
have done so for several reasons:
• Compensation, both current (salaries, one-time 
incentive payments, etc.) and deferred (primarily 
pensions), is a major expense for school districts.
• Compensation policies aﬀ ect who chooses to enter 
and stay in teaching.  
• Th e so-called “single salary schedule” which 
structures how most teachers are paid is too rigid, 
resulting in perennial shortages of teachers in 
some subjects.  It rewards teacher characteristics 
(years of experience and academic credentials) 
that are not strongly linked to student learning, 
and it ignores measures of teacher eﬀ ectiveness in 
the classroom.  Recent research documents how 
teacher resources are misallocated across schools 
(to the detriment of the most at-risk students), 
a misallocation that results in part from the lack 
of monetary incentives for teachers to take on the 
toughest assignments.  
• New research shows that long-standing teacher 
pension policies serve long-serving individuals well 
but impose signiﬁ cant ﬁ nancial penalties on mobile 
and short-term teachers.  Moreover, these policies 
incorporate features that are ineﬃ  cient from a 
personnel management perspective.
• Despite their shortcomings, compensation poli-
cies have proven remarkably resistant to change.  
Two conditions are necessary for reforms to take 
hold:  (1) good ideas about how compensation 
policies could be improved and (2) the political 
will to overcome the natural resistance to change 
on the part of beneﬁ ciaries of the current system, 
resistance which has often proven to be formidable.  
Moreover, whereas school districts alone can 
choose to address many of their human capital 
xchallenges, compensation is unusual in the extent 
to which it is embedded in both district and state 
policy.  Even districts that might want to move in 
the direction of aligning compensation with their 
educational objectives can often ﬁ nd themselves 
limited by state policies that impose one-size-ﬁ ts-
all solutions.  
Th us, we believe that we can most eﬀ ectively contribute 
to the human capital agenda by issuing a call to arms 
to our fellow business leaders and others interested 
in the quality of public schools to become (1) 
informed about current compensation policies and 
options for improvement and (2) active proponents 
of change at all levels of government.
Because public education is a state and local respon-
sibility in the United States, meaningful reform will 
have to come about in 50 state capitals and over 14,000 
school districts.  Th is will require a lot of hard and 
sustained work.  Th e dual focus is essential, however, 
since one-size-ﬁ ts-all solutions imposed by state policy 
makers (even if they were inclined to do so) will often 
be inappropriate for local conditions and are likely to 
engender opposition if key stakeholders, including 
teachers themselves, are not part of the discussion.  
Some might question the wisdom of urging com-
pensation reform at a time when states and districts 
are suﬀ ering from severe budget pressures and when 
administrators are preoccupied with avoiding layoﬀ s 
and trying to minimize the damage to their educational 
programs from funding shortfalls.  Our belief is that 
these immediate problems must not completely divert 
attention from longer-run needs.   Our report will 
show that, while the problems with current compensa-
tion plans are fairly obvious, there is still a lot to learn 
about how to improve them.  Eﬀ ective compensation 
reforms take time to develop, implement, evaluate, and 
revise.  Even if policy makers are not in a position to 
adopt large-scale changes immediately, the spadework 
to support future reforms needs to be underway now.  
Moreover, today’s economic crisis reinforces the impor-
tance of ensuring that whatever resources are available 
to support public education are used as eﬀ ectively and 
as eﬃ  ciently as possible.  
Th us we hope this report spurs wider engagement with 
the important topic of teacher compensation and serves 
as a catalyst for discussion of compensation policies 
that are better aligned with the nation’s educational 
needs.  
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1America’s elementary and secondary schools must 
attract and retain a large number of high-quality 
teachers if the nation is to reach its goals of raising 
the academic achievement of all students.  Traditional 
compensation policies for teachers (salary schedules 
that reward only longevity and academic credentials 
and pension policies that penalize mobile teachers and 
those who do not spend a lifetime career in teaching) 
are not structured to encourage talented individuals 
to enter the teaching profession and reward them 
for strong performance.  Promising examples of 
compensation reform are beginning to appear in states 
and districts around the country.  Th ey should serve 
as models for and provide lessons to the many states 
and districts that still cling to outmoded approaches to 
teacher salaries and pensions.
Pay and pension policies that now characterize most 
state and local teacher compensation systems were 
designed in an era when (1) schools had access to 
a labor force including many talented women and 
minorities with few other professional opportunities 
and (2) policy makers wanted to encourage and reward 
teachers who stayed on the job for thirty or more years. 
Th e labor force of the 21st century has changed.  
Teaching must now compete with the whole array of 
employers eager to hire the best applicants regardless of 
gender or race.  Workers, especially younger ones, are 
less interested in staying in one place or in one type of 
job for their entire careers than were the teachers who 
entered the profession several decades ago.  Younger 
workers do not shy away from jobs where performance 
is evaluated and rewarded.
Th e pool of people eligible to teach is limited to those 
who have at least an undergraduate college degree, 
about a third of the civilian labor force.  Of all college-
educated individuals, the nation’s elementary and sec-
ondary schools (public and private) employed 9 percent 
as teachers in 2008.  Since teaching continues to attract 
more women than men by a three to one margin, about 
14 percent of college-educated women in the civilian 
labor force in 2008 worked as teachers (compared to 
about 4 percent of college-educated men). 
Th us at any one time schools need to attract a large 
proportion of the available talent pool to their 
classrooms.  Competition from other professions has 
diminished education’s ability to entice the best.  High-
aptitude women as measured by high school class rank 
are now noticeably less likely to become teachers than 
they were in the 1960s.
Given a more mobile labor force and the array of pro-
fessional opportunities now open to all, it is unrealistic 
to expect that education can hold onto almost a tenth 
of the “best and brightest” college graduates for 30 or 
more years.  And evidence suggests the most eﬀ ective 
teachers do not need to spend a great many years in 
the classroom to reach their peak performance.  In fact, 
research indicates that teacher quality as measured 
by student learning rises for the ﬁ rst few years of a 
teacher’s career and then largely levels out.
Th us, compensation policies that aim to create as 
highly qualiﬁ ed a talent pool as possible to staﬀ  the 
nation’s schools would emphasize not only attracting 
and retaining individuals who envision a full career 
in teaching but also highly qualiﬁ ed individuals who 
view teaching as only one of several career stops.  Such 
policies would reward eﬀ ective teaching and provide 
opportunities for good teachers to receive professional 
recognition and promotion while remaining in the 
classroom.  Th ey would also address the need to recruit 
talented teachers to all subject areas and schools, 
including those that have a hard time attracting quali-
ﬁ ed staﬀ .  
Most current pay and pension policies do not have 
these characteristics.  New approaches to teacher 
compensation are needed.  
Teacher Compensation and Teacher Quality
Summary
2Pay
Pay for most teachers is determined by a pay scale 
commonly referred to as a “single salary schedule.”  Th is 
grid-like schedule sets pay according to “steps” that 
measure years of experience and “lanes” that reﬂ ect 
academic degrees and credentials.  Th e entire schedule 
itself is typically revised upward each year as school 
boards approve cost-of-living adjustments which are 
applied to each cell in the schedule.  Sometimes these 
adjustments are applied across the board.  In other 
cases (for example, as part of a deliberate strategy 
to raise the relative pay of beginning teachers) year-
to-year adjustments to the speciﬁ c cells in the salary 
schedule may be variable.
Traditional single salary schedules suﬀ er from a 
number of shortcomings:
• Th ey ignore teacher performance as a criterion 
for teacher pay.  Recent research shows that 
longevity after the ﬁ rst few years in the classroom 
and academic credits are not strong indicators of 
whether a teacher is successful in raising student 
achievement.  Rewarding eﬀ ective teaching requires 
a more direct link between teacher pay and mea-
sures of student learning.
• Salary schedules contribute to persistent teacher 
shortages in certain subjects and schools.  Without 
some kind of diﬀ erential pay, educational admin-
istrators cannot eﬀ ectively compete for teachers 
of subjects like math and science who have many, 
often more-lucrative opportunities in the private 
sector labor market.  Th ey also have trouble 
attracting teachers to especially demanding jobs, 
such as those in schools serving high numbers of 
at-risk students.  Th ese schools are often staﬀ ed by 
less-qualiﬁ ed teachers who turn over rapidly.
• Salary schedules create no incentives for in-
structionally eﬀ ective professional development.  
Teachers can raise their salaries by accumulating 
additional academic credits and degrees.  Often 
teachers make independent decisions about what 
kinds of advanced study to pursue.  Th ey do 
not have incentives to participate in professional 
development programs that are targeted to their 
own or their school’s speciﬁ c needs.
Th ese shortcomings have been widely discussed for a 
long time.  In recent years some encouraging initiatives 
to reform teacher pay have been launched, although 
they are still too fragmented and tentative to suggest 
that single salary schedules are on their way out.  Th e 
ProComp program jointly developed by Denver 
Public Schools and the Denver Classroom Teachers 
Association demonstrates that it is possible to replace 
the single salary schedule with a wholly-new frame-
work for teacher pay that provides permanent salary 
increases and one-time bonuses on the basis of (1) 
teacher knowledge and skills; (2) professional evalu-
ation; (3) student academic growth, measured both 
for individual teachers and for whole schools; and (4)  
market incentives for service in hard-to-serve schools 
and hard-to-staﬀ  subjects.  More limited reforms in a 
number of states and districts (in some cases funded 
through federal incentive grants) are beginning to 
accumulate valuable lessons about how to design and 
implement desirable elements of a redesigned teacher 
pay system such as performance-based pay, pay linked 
to career paths, and labor-market-based pay.
Performance-Based Pay
Linking some part of teacher pay to eﬀ ectiveness on the 
job is a necessary reform that would put teachers on a 
similar footing with other working professionals.  We 
believe that winning public support for higher salaries 
(which teachers and their representatives strongly 
advocate) requires pay systems that reﬂ ect teachers’ 
success in improving student outcomes.
Performance-based pay is the most sensitive issue in 
debates over compensation, in part because the “merit-
pay” movement of the 1980s was singularly unsuccess-
ful and short-lived and engendered enduring skepticism 
among teachers.  It is imperative that current eﬀ orts 
give suﬃ  cient attention to the challenges of design and 
implementation and that policy makers and adminis-
trators work with teachers who are interested in being 
constructive partners in ﬁ nding acceptable ways to link 
pay and performance.
Performance-pay plans require careful attention to 
design to ensure that desired behavior is fairly mea-
sured and rewarded and that unintended consequences 
are avoided.   Combining group awards (for example, to 
3all the staﬀ  of a high-performing school or department) 
with individual awards to teachers whose students 
show exceptional academic improvement is one way 
of encouraging teacher cooperation and collaboration 
while avoiding the “free-rider” problem that can occur if 
teachers who are not carrying their weight are rewarded 
anyway based on a whole group’s eﬀ ort.
Th e methodological issues in measuring student 
learning (whether for pay calculations or for other 
accountability purposes) are substantial.  Measuring 
only absolute levels of student achievement, rather 
than the growth in achievement, can result in teachers 
being rewarded because they teach students from more 
advantaged backgrounds (since test scores are highly 
related to family background and socio-economic ad-
vantage) rather than teachers who are the most success-
ful in raising student achievement.  States and districts 
are addressing this concern by developing “value-added” 
measures of student learning.  At present, such mea-
sures appear most useful for making group awards and 
for measuring the eﬀ ectiveness of individual teachers 
over several years.  Single-year measures are less reliable 
for determining on an annual basis which individual 
teachers are successful in improving student learning.
Performance-pay initiatives such as those in Houston, 
Florida, Minnesota, Texas and elsewhere are begin-
ning to show how performance pay can be designed 
and implemented in ways that avoid the problems 
encountered by earlier “merit-pay” plans.  Important 
lessons are emerging, such as the importance of com-
munication, of balancing transparency and complexity 
in developing understandable and fair award formulas, 
and of making clear how performance pay ﬁ ts as part of 
a larger eﬀ ort to improve teacher quality.
CED Trustees, based on their experiences leading 
business and academic organizations, also believe that 
qualitative as well as quantitative evaluations of indi-
vidual performance have a place in a performance-pay 
system.  Qualitative evaluations, whether conducted 
by principals or by other administrators or teachers, 
have the advantage of being able to take into account a 
broader range of teacher performance and educational 
objectives than test-score performance alone.  Teachers 
often have valid concerns that qualitative judgments 
could reﬂ ect bias and favoritism, but such concerns 
should not be used to block the development of fair 
qualitative evaluation systems.
Successfully linking pay to performance in education 
must still be understood as a work in progress that 
requires more experimentation with alternative pay 
design, careful evaluation, and an implementation 
process compatible with adaptation and continuous 
improvement of performance-pay plans.  Th e eﬀ ort is 
worth it, as the limited research available to date sup-
ports the idea that performance pay can lead to better 
learning outcomes for students.
Pay Linked to Career Paths
Th e structure of a typical teacher’s career is “ﬂ at.”  
Regardless of how long an individual has been on the 
job or how eﬀ ective he or she is, a teacher generally 
cannot receive formal recognition and pay for profes-
sional advancement without leaving the classroom for 
an administrative position.  Developing career paths 
along which teachers could progress based on both 
qualitative and quantitative measures of their perfor-
mance over time is a promising way to address both 
the ﬂ at-career problem and the limitations of one-year 
test scores as measures of teacher eﬀ ectiveness.  Career 
paths could be a means of signiﬁ cantly raising pay for 
high-performing teachers while not resorting to ineﬃ  -
cient and expensive (but all too often used) across-the-
board pay increases.
Like “merit pay,” so-called career ladders had a brief 
and largely unsuccessful run in the 1980s.  Insuﬃ  cient 
funding and inadequate appraisal systems doomed 
many eﬀ orts.   Several recent initiatives incorporate 
multiple career paths that recognize teachers’ diﬀ ering 
career aspirations and/or link compensation levels to 
teacher positions that are awarded through a competi-
tive,  performance-based process.  A somewhat diﬀ er-
ent approach to teacher pathways embraces full-year 
jobs for teachers who want and qualify for them.  
Opportunities for promotion within teaching and for 
year-round employment are important approaches 
worth trying.  A desirable teacher compensation system 
is not just one that appeals to individuals currently 
attracted to teaching, but one that will draw in other 
talented individuals who may now shun the profession 
because of its limited opportunities for advancement 
and for pay commensurate with full-year responsibili-
ties.
4Labor-Market-Based Pay
Th ere are diﬀ erences in the supply of and demand for 
teachers by subject area.  Moreover, teachers demon-
strate diﬀ erential preferences for where they teach.  Th e 
eﬀ ects of diﬀ erences in supply and demand in teacher 
labor markets cannot be wished away.  If pay policies 
do not take them into account, labor market realities 
will be reﬂ ected in other ways, most likely by reducing 
the quality of teachers available for diﬀ erent assign-
ments.  Th ough teachers often argue that they are all 
underpaid and that across-the-board raises are needed, 
our assessment of the evidence is that there is not a 
uniform, pervasive mismatch between the supply of 
and demand for teachers.  Instead, shortages are more 
localized in nature and disproportionately characterize 
some schools and some subject areas.  
A number of districts are trying out ways of using 
ﬁ nancial incentives to attract the teachers they require 
and place them in the schools that most need them.  
Th e latest available data indicate, however, that many 
fewer districts are using labor-market-based pay than 
report diﬃ  culties in hiring teachers for all ﬁ elds of 
study and all classrooms.
Current eﬀ orts are also sometimes poorly targeted, 
may not involve enough extra pay to change teacher 
behavior, and may be not suﬃ  ciently coordinated with 
other improvements, especially in working conditions 
that have been shown to matter to teachers.
Successful Pay Reform
Denver’s ProComp complete pay restructuring and 
modiﬁ cations in other districts of the single salary 
schedule point the way to making teacher compensa-
tion a more eﬀ ective tool for attracting and keeping 
high quality teachers.  It should be remembered, 
however, that districts operate in diﬀ erent labor 
markets and have diﬀ erent needs, which should be 
reﬂ ected in local pay plans.  Furthermore, a key lesson 
from both past and current eﬀ orts to implement new 
kinds of compensation is that reforms are unlikely to 
work if they are imposed from the outside rather than 
developed locally and jointly by the various stakehold-
ers who will have to support and sustain them over 
time.  Th is lesson is especially important for state 
and federal policy makers interested in how they can 
eﬀ ectively incentivize and support pay reform eﬀ orts.
Pensions
Th e structure of most current pension plans for 
teachers works at cross purposes with the objective of 
raising teacher quality by enlarging the pool of talented 
individuals who are willing to teach.  It discourages 
teachers from moving from place to place (even though 
some states have teacher surpluses while others have 
shortages) and from teaching for less than a full career.
Pension beneﬁ ts for teachers, as for most state and local 
employees, are provided almost universally through 
deﬁ ned beneﬁ t (DB) plans.  Teacher plans are largely 
state-based and promise retirement income based on 
years of service and the ﬁ nal average salary earned in 
the last years of teaching.  Th e continuing reliance of 
public employers on this form of pension plan, which 
is far less prevalent in the private sector, is frequently 
justiﬁ ed on the grounds that it is desirable to have a 
long-term, stable public work force to serve community 
needs and that it is important to ensure loyal career 
employees that they will have a secure source of income 
once they retire.  Th e back-loaded beneﬁ ts embedded 
in the ﬁ nal-average-salary DB formula are designed to 
meet these objectives for long-serving teachers.
Eﬀ ects on Retirement Age, Mobility, and Short-Term 
Teachers
Th e retirement-beneﬁ t component of teachers’ com-
pensation packages creates incentives for long-serving 
teachers to retire at relatively young ages and penalizes 
mobile teachers (particularly those who cross state 
lines), thus making it harder for administrators who 
may be grappling with teacher shortages.  Pension 
policies create ﬁ nancial disincentives for talented 
individuals who might be willing to devote part of their 
working lives to teaching but who do not want to make 
teaching a lifetime career.
Financial penalties for mobile or short-term teachers 
are primarily the result of the way ﬁ nal-average-salary 
DB plans backload their beneﬁ ts.  Pension wealth* for 
participants in these DB plans grows very slowly for 
20 or so years and then rises rapidly.  Recent research 
* Pension wealth is a measure of the present value of a stream of payments or the market value of an equivalent annuity.
5on six states has shown that a mobile teacher who 
splits a 30-year career evenly between jobs in two states 
can lose from 40 to nearly 75 percent of the pension 
wealth he or she could have accumulated by staying in 
the ﬁ rst job for the full 30 years.  Mobile teachers may 
also suﬀ er ﬁ nancial penalties because vesting periods 
(i.e., the years of service required to qualify to receive a 
pension someday) are long in teacher plans compared 
to the private sector.  In nine states, teachers have 
to work for 10 years before becoming vested in the 
pension plan.  
Teacher pension plans also eﬀ ectively redistribute 
pension wealth from short-term teachers to those who 
serve for many years.  Recent research on six states 
compared the pension wealth accumulated by teach-
ers under existing plans who enter the profession at 
age 25 with the pension wealth they would have had 
if pension contributions had been invested instead 
in a ﬁ scally-neutral plan.  Sixty-ﬁ ve to 80 percent of 
teachers (comparative short-terms who on average 
separate from service when they are in their 30s) have 
lower accumulated pension wealth than they would 
have had under the ﬁ scally neutral plan.  Twenty to 35 
percent (the long-term teachers, on average separating 
in their 50s) would have more pension wealth under 
the traditional DB plan.  In eﬀ ect, short-term teachers 
earn a lower rate of deferred compensation than do 
long-term teachers.  
Rethinking Pension Policy and Practice
A few states have adopted plans or plan provisions 
that provide better treatment than traditional plans 
for mobile and short-term teachers.  Some give par-
ticipants the option of selecting a deﬁ ned contribution 
(DC) plan, where individuals own their own accounts 
and are entitled to the contributions to and investment 
returns on them, as their primary pension plan.  A 
few states have hybrid DB/DC plans.  South Dakota 
has created a “portable retirement option” within its 
traditional DB plan.  Alaska recently made a DC plan 
the primary pension plan for all new workers.
Discussions of public pension reform often take the 
form of debates over the virtues of ﬁ nal-average-salary 
DB versus DC plans, but this oversimpliﬁ es the issue.  
Teachers in 13 states do not participate in Social 
Security, so without DB pensions they do not have 
access to guaranteed, inﬂ ation-adjusted retirement 
income as other workers do.  Th e recent turmoil in 
ﬁ nancial markets has also heightened sensitivity to 
the investment risks that DC plans pose to employees, 
risks that employers bear in DB plans.
Th ere are a number of reforms to deﬁ ned beneﬁ t 
plans that could reduce or eliminate some of their 
problematic features while still providing teachers with 
the advantages of participating in a deﬁ ned beneﬁ t 
plan.  Th ese include hybrid plans and portability 
options such as those already described.  Th ey also 
include a type of deﬁ ned beneﬁ t plan called a cash 
balance plan, which measures accumulated beneﬁ ts in 
terms of a stated account balance as DC plans do, and 
promises ﬁ xed investment returns.  Private employers 
who continue to sponsor deﬁ ned beneﬁ t pensions 
have moved nearly a quarter of their workers into cash 
balance plans.  In the public sector, only Nebraska uses 
a cash balance plan as the primary plan for state and 
local employees, but the state’s teachers remain in a 
separate traditional DB plan.
Treating mobile and short-term teachers more fairly 
will have at least short-term costs unless these costs 
are oﬀ set by some decrease in the generous beneﬁ ts 
that teacher pensions typically promise.  Th ese include 
eligibility for normal retirement with full beneﬁ ts at 
young ages (often in the 50s) and other early retirement 
beneﬁ ts, annual cost of living adjustments for retirees 
who have begun drawing their annuities, and retiree 
health beneﬁ ts. 
Many public pension plans are already under ﬁ scal 
pressure, both from large losses due to the ongoing 
economic recession and from longer-term policies that 
have led many plans to be under-funded relative to the 
obligations they will eventually have to meet.  Employer 
pension contributions are already substantial, and they 
are growing relative to the retirement contributions 
made on behalf of private-sector professionals by 
employers.  To the extent that current contributions 
and investment earnings are insuﬃ  cient to pay pension 
promises, dollars that might go for other education 
purposes such as compensation reforms designed to 
enlarge the teacher talent pool will have to be directed 
toward commitments incurred under current pension 
arrangements.
Public sector pensions operate under a complex set 
of state-based constitutional and statutory provisions 
6that vary across the country and that appear to make 
it diﬃ  cult to alter pension beneﬁ ts for workers already 
on the job, even for workers who are many years away 
from retirement.  Th ere may be more ﬂ exibility than 
generally believed to consider pension changes, but 
this will require careful state-by-state analysis.  Policy 
makers in each state need to review carefully the 
legal limitations on their pension plans and consider 
whether statutory (or even constitutional) changes 
would provide appropriate ﬂ exibility to alter pension 
arrangements to address changing circumstances while 
oﬀ ering appropriate protections to current and future 
plan participants. 
Enabling Conditions
Successfully reforming teacher compensation systems 
will require attention to “enabling conditions:”  the 
tools, policies, and practices without which new com-
pensation policies will be less eﬀ ective than they should 
be at encouraging genuine instructional improvement 
and increased student learning.  Th ese conditions 
include:
• Improved teacher evaluation and professional 
development systems.  Teacher evaluation is 
notorious for its “drive-by” nature, with evalua-
tors (frequently administrators, often untrained) 
making a ﬂ eeting classroom visit using a checklist 
of classroom conditions and teacher behaviors that 
have little to do with the quality of instruction.  
Professional development, which should have 
among its purposes helping poorly performing 
teachers overcome their weaknesses, often takes 
the form of fragmentary one-day workshops that 
are insuﬃ  ciently intense and that do not focus 
on meaningful instructional improvement.  Some 
good practices in teacher evaluation and profes-
sional development have been identiﬁ ed.  More 
need to be developed, and all need to become the 
norm rather than the exception in the nation’s 
schools.
• Improved student and teacher data systems.  
Using student performance to help determine 
teacher compensation, whether that performance 
is measured quantitatively or qualitatively, will 
require much better data systems than currently 
exist in many states and school districts.
• Sustainable funding.  Reforming teacher com-
pensation will almost certainly require additional 
funding, at least in the short to medium term.  Too 
often in the past, eﬀ orts to reform compensation 
have faltered in part because funding was not avail-
able to sustain new pay arrangements.  Reforms 
often attract initial funding from outside groups on 
a one-time basis, but states and districts will need 
to be prepared to pick up the costs once the outside 
funding disappears.  In the long term, there should 
be savings from a more eﬃ  cient compensation 
system that could help sustain reforms.  Savings 
could come, for example, by capturing the large 
amount of money currently spent under the single 
salary schedule to reward teachers for advanced 
academic credentials that have not proven to be 
related to student learning.  Savings might also be 
found through pension changes that reduce early 
retirement incentives, raise normal retirement 
ages, and limit employer investment risks through 
something like a cash balance plan.
• Supportive state and federal policies.  States 
and the federal government can encourage teacher 
compensation reforms by providing ﬁ nancial incen-
tives and technical assistance in support of new 
forms of pay and removing obstacles to revising 
and adequately funding pay plans.
• Wide stakeholder involvement.  A clear lesson 
that emerges from both successful and unsuccess-
ful eﬀ orts to reform teacher compensation is the 
importance of engaging a wide group of stakehold-
ers, including teachers themselves, in the design 
and implementation of new compensation plans.
How Business Leaders Can Encourage 
Compensation Reform
Business, as employers of the products of public 
schools and as organizations with a strong stake in the 
country’s economic and social well-being, needs to be 
one of the active stakeholder groups at the table when 
compensation policies are decided.  Business leaders 
can make the case to the public that current policies are 
inadequate.  Th ey can be forceful and knowledgeable 
“critical friends” in insisting that states and districts 
undertake vigorous eﬀ orts to design, implement, evalu-
ate, and reﬁ ne new approaches. 
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ready to be disseminated throughout our vast educa-
tion “non-system.”  Th e nation has fairly limited experi-
ence with alternatives to the single salary schedule 
and the ﬁ nal-average-salary pension plan.  Evidence 
about exactly which alternatives will be most eﬀ ective 
in attracting and keeping the teachers we want is not 
yet robust.  Moreover, public education is provided 
through 50 states and over 14,000 school districts 
which vary in their capacity and needs.  Teacher 
pensions are generally the product of political negotia-
tions at the state level, unlike salaries which are often 
collectively bargained by teacher unions and local 
school authorities.  Local pay structures, however, must 
comply with provisions of the state education code 
which may mandate single salary schedules, minimum 
salaries, and the like. 
Th us business leaders interested in compensation 
reform will need to encourage both state and district 
policy makers to take appropriate steps to align com-
pensation policies with the goal of improving teacher 
quality.  CED’s study provides speciﬁ c examples of 
promising reforms.  In addition, we have distilled from 
our analysis the following principles that business 
leaders can use to guide deliberations toward a “con-
tinuous improvement” approach to teacher compensa-
tion policies. 
• Teachers should be evaluated for compensation pur-
poses in part on the basis of on-the-job performance 
as demonstrated by student learning.  Quantitative 
measures of learning, where available, and qualitative 
assessments of teachers’ skills, knowledge, and class-
room eﬀ ectiveness should be utilized.
• Compensation policies should treat teachers equitably 
whether they stay on the job for 20 to 30 years or 
work in teaching for a more limited time.  Th ese 
policies should not penalize teachers interested in being 
in the classroom for less than a full career, such as 
second-career teachers and those who want to pursue 
another career after a period in the classroom.  Th ey 
should not penalize teachers who move to a diﬀ erent 
district or state.
• Career paths with signiﬁ cant opportunities for promo-
tion and increased compensation should be created 
for teachers.  Teachers should not have to leave the 
classroom for administrative positions in order to raise 
their salaries signiﬁ cantly.  Th ey should have options 
for full-time, full-year employment, as administrators 
do.
• New compensation policies should reﬂ ect the fact 
that teachers in some ﬁ elds are harder to recruit and 
retain because they have more numerous employment 
opportunities outside of education.  Compensation for 
teachers should reﬂ ect these labor market realities, as 
does compensation for college professors, doctors, and 
virtually all other professionals.
• New compensation policies should create incentives 
for teachers to take jobs in schools facing the biggest 
performance challenges.  Without such incentives, 
teaching talent will continue to be very inequitably 
distributed, to the disadvantage of the most at-risk 
students.  
• Policy makers should support the “enabling conditions” 
that are necessary for designing and implementing new 
compensation systems that encourage genuine instruc-
tional improvement and increased student learning.  
Th ese include (1) more eﬀ ective teacher evaluation 
and professional development systems, (2) better 
student and teacher data systems, (3) sustainable 
funding, (4) state and federal policies that incentiv-
ize districts to create new forms of pay and remove 
obstacles to their doing so, and (5) wide stakeholder 
involvement in the process of compensation reform.
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9Common sense suggests and research increasingly con-
ﬁ rms that teachers are a critical inﬂ uence on student 
learning.  Classrooms that are led by eﬀ ective teachers 
are key to improving American education.  Teachers 
cannot be expected to raise student achievement on 
their own; the entire elementary and secondary system 
must be oriented toward high performance.*  Genuine 
education improvement, however, will not be ac-
complished without teachers who can help all students 
reach high academic standards.
Effective Teachers for All Students
Reforming compensation policies is one part of the 
answer to attracting high-quality teachers.  A new 
concept taking hold among researchers and founda-
tions is “strategic human capital management.”  As 
the Annenberg Institute for School Reform puts it, 
…human capital management refers to how an 
organization tries to acquire, increase, and sustain 
[the talent level of its employees] over time.  More 
speciﬁ cally, it refers to the entire continuum of 
activities and policies that aﬀ ect teachers over their 
work life at a given school district.   Th ese activities 
range from recruitment and selection, to hiring 
and induction, to deployment and redeployment 
of training and support, to evaluation, career 
advancement, compensation, and the termination of 
ineﬀ ective teachers…1
Not only are the various elements of the human capital 
agenda receiving increased attention, but it is also 
becoming more widely recognized (as, for example, by 
the Strategic Management of Human Capital project 
at the University of Wisconsin, described in Figure 
1) that the various human resource elements need 
to be strategically aligned with the key objective of 
schools:  improving student learning.  
Th e emphasis on academic achievement as the primary 
criterion for judging the eﬀ ectiveness of a teacher is in 
CHAPTER 1:  Introduction
* See Memorandum, p. 56.
Figure 1—Strategic Management of 
Human Capital (SMHC) project
SMHC seeks to improve student achievement in 
the nation’s 100 largest public school districts by 
helping them attract top talent and manage this 
talent in ways that support the strategic direc-
tions of each district.  Th e ﬁ ve-year project, which 
is based at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, 
brings together policy makers and researchers to 
1) deﬁ ne strategic management of human capital 
in public education, 2) create a network of leaders 
actively reengineering human capital manage-
ment systems in public education, 3) document 
the nature and impact of leading-edge human 
capital management systems in several districts 
and states, 4) establish SMHC as a prominent 
issue on the nation’s education reform agenda, 
and 5) advance local and state policies to support 
widespread adoption of SMHC in public educa-
tion.  Key practices and initiatives being examined 
include:
• Instructional improvement strategies
• Uses of student data that help improve 
classroom instruction
• Recruitment strategies
• Selection processes
• Placement strategies
• Induction/mentoring programs
• Performance management including evalua-
tion of teachers and principals
• Professional development practices
• Strategic use of compensation for teachers 
and principals
Information about the project can be found at 
http://www.smhc-cpre.org.
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keeping with CED’s long-standing focus on “putting 
learning ﬁ rst.”2  We said in a 1994 report by that name 
and have repeated since that
Th e primary mission of the public schools should be 
learning and achievement.  Schools should solidly 
ground all students in language and mathematical skills 
and provide them with a broad base of knowledge in 
subjects such as literature, science, foreign languages, 
history, social sciences, and the arts.  Students should be 
able to use and apply this knowledge.  Academic course 
work for all students should be rigorous and substantial.
We recognized in that report that schools have other 
essential missions as well, such as socializing young-
sters and preparing future citizens.  Th ese missions 
must continue to be important considerations in 
evaluating our schools and the success of the people 
who staﬀ  them.  But student learning is the primary job 
of schools, and policies without this objective at their 
core are inadequate.
Ensuring that all students have eﬀ ective teachers is a 
major challenge, not least because the nation needs 
a lot of people to staﬀ  its schools.  In 2008, just over 
4 million teachers were employed full- or part-time 
in elementary and secondary schools.*3 Th is does not 
include many other individuals, including principals 
and assistant principals, instructional coordinators, 
curriculum developers, and others, whose jobs also 
directly aﬀ ect the quality of instruction. Th e core of the 
challenge is that, at any given time, the nation needs a 
remarkably high proportion of its college graduates to 
be teachers (and even more to be working in positions 
related to teaching).  In 2008 the civilian labor force 
age 25 and over with bachelor’s degrees or higher 
numbered just over 45 million, so teachers accounted 
for about 9 percent of such individuals who held or 
were seeking jobs.  Other professions that draw mostly 
on college-educated talent employ many fewer workers: 
in 2008, the United States had, for example, 553,690 
lawyers, 110,900 architects, 605,110 social workers, 
568,400 doctors, 1.3 million postsecondary teach-
ers, 1.5 million engineers, and 2.5 million registered 
nurses.4
Exacerbating the challenge is the fact that teaching 
has historically been more attractive to women than 
to men.  Women currently hold about three-quarters 
of the teaching jobs in elementary and secondary 
schools.  Th is means that about 14 percent of the 
college-educated women in the labor force are working 
as teachers.  Only about 4 percent of college-educated 
men are teaching in elementary and secondary schools.
With schools needing so many college graduates to 
staﬀ  their classrooms, can teaching jobs as currently 
designed attract enough talented individuals to the 
profession so the nation can accomplish its educa-
tional goals?  We think not.  
Making teaching more attractive to talented college 
graduates has many dimensions, but one central 
concern relates to pay. Existing compensation policies, 
for both current pay and deferred pay in the form of 
pension beneﬁ ts, were created for a model of teaching 
that treated all teachers and teaching jobs as the same, 
rewarded teachers solely based on years of experi-
ence and academic credentials, and sought to retain 
teachers in the profession for a working lifetime.  Th is 
model, which an Aspen Institute paper dubbed the 
“factory model,”5  is increasingly out of step with the 
way workers view their careers and inconsistent with 
the evidence on how teaching experience is related 
to instructional eﬀ ectiveness.  Twenty-ﬁ rst-century 
workers expect to be mobile, both geographically and 
among occupations.  Employers and many workers, too, 
believe that strong performance on the job should be 
rewarded.  Researchers provide growing evidence that 
years on the job and academic credentials beyond the 
bachelor’s degree are weak indicators of which teachers 
are most eﬀ ective in improving student learning.
Th e nation needs new approaches to teacher com-
pensation.  We do not believe schools can attract 
enough promising individuals to teaching and to the 
classrooms where they are most needed if we expect 
9 percent of college graduates to devote themselves 
to teaching for a lifetime and impose ﬁ nancial penal-
ties on those who do not,  if we fail to reward good 
teaching with better pay and promotion opportuni-
ties, if we continue to employ most teachers on less 
than a year-round basis and pay them accordingly, 
and if we pay teachers the same no matter what or 
* Th is ﬁ gure comes from the Bureau of Labor Statistics at the U.S. Department of Labor.  Th e U.S. Department of Education’s National Center for 
Education Statistics reports a widely-cited ﬁ gure of 3.2 million public school teachers (plus an additional half-million private school teachers) for 2007, 
but these ﬁ gures have been calculated as full-time-equivalent positions.  Th e BLS data report the number of individuals in teaching in 2008.
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where they teach.  We focus on teachers in this report 
because of their numbers, but many of the same argu-
ments can be made in support of new pay structures for 
principals and other education administrators.
Undoubtedly some individuals who are or who would 
be outstanding teachers like the existing arrangements, 
such as school-year schedules that are “family friendly.”  
It is desirable to keep some existing policies as options 
for those people who like the current approach to 
compensation.  We will provide evidence, however, sug-
gesting that maintaining or improving teacher quality 
will become increasingly diﬃ  cult without new policies 
designed to make teaching attractive to promising 
people who are willing to spend part but not a whole 
career in education.  We will show that current com-
pensation policies are ineﬃ  cient in terms of attracting 
teachers and encouraging them to teach where they are 
most needed.
We are mindful of the challenges in identifying 
eﬀ ective teachers.  Research is increasingly providing 
evidence that some teachers are clearly more eﬀ ective 
than others in raising student achievement.6  To date, 
though, scholars have been less successful at identifying 
the particular characteristics of teachers that seem to 
predict their eﬀ ectiveness.  Moreover, the qualities that 
may make a teacher eﬀ ective with one group of stu-
dents (e.g., aﬄ  uent high school physics students) may 
be quite diﬀ erent from the qualities that make a teacher 
eﬀ ective with another group (e.g., disadvantaged inner-
city elementary school students).  Many aspects of 
learning are not adequately reﬂ ected in existing mea-
sures of student achievement, which tend to emphasize 
standardized tests in a limited number of subjects.  For 
this reason and for technical reasons relating to the 
validity and reliability of testing, it may be diﬃ  cult or 
impossible to make the connection between individual 
teachers and student learning outcomes, especially on 
an annual basis.  Th erefore, we believe that qualitative 
as well as quantitative measures of teacher eﬀ ective-
ness should be employed in determining how well 
teachers are performing.  We believe that there is a 
role for indirect measures such as whether teachers 
have the knowledge and skills that can reasonably be 
expected to inﬂ uence student learning.  
How Labor Market Changes Have 
Affected Teacher Quality
Since the 1960s, job opportunities for women have 
increased dramatically.  No longer are women largely 
relegated to the “female” professions of teaching, 
nursing, librarianship, and social work.  At the same 
time, the relative salaries of teachers compared to other 
professions have declined.  Th ese developments have 
raised widespread fears that the quality of teachers has 
also declined.  Th ere is some evidence that this is true, 
but the decline was not as serious as might have been 
expected in part because the proportion of women 
obtaining college degrees also grew.   Looking ahead, 
however, we cannot expect to see this same increase in 
the numbers of college-educated women to mitigate the 
eﬀ ects of other labor market changes.  Th is strength-
ens our belief that schools will have a harder time 
competing for talent in the future unless they have 
compensation policies that are in step with the needs 
and preferences of 21st century workers.
Both the expansion of employment opportunities 
for women and the growth in the number of female 
college graduates in the latter half of the 20th century 
were remarkable.  One study7 showed that the fraction 
of young females age 25-34 with at least a four-year 
college degree grew from 8.9 percent to 27.8 percent 
between 1964 and 2000.  Over that same time period 
and for the same age group, the proportion of women 
who participated in the labor force grew from 37.2 
percent to 80 percent.  Th e authors of this study also 
developed an “index of gender representation” based 
on the proportion of females in selected occupations 
divided by the female share of the labor force, with 
a value of less than one suggesting that women were 
underrepresented in the occupation.  Between 1964 
and 2000, the index for physicians went from 0.33 to 
.89 and index for lawyers from 0.08 to 0.87.  Th ese 
numbers are one indication of how public schools now 
have to compete for college graduates who were once a 
largely captive labor pool.
As opportunities for women outside teaching were 
increasing, teacher salaries were declining relative to 
other professions.  For women in the 1940s and 1950s, 
teaching was a relatively well-paying career.  In 1940, 
for example, nearly 70 percent of college-educated 
female non-teachers earned less than the average 
teacher.  Th is percentage fell steadily until, by 2000, 
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only about 45 percent of college-educated female non-
teachers earned less than the average teacher.  Among 
young women (age 20-29), in 2000 the percentage of 
non-teachers earning less than the average teacher was 
slightly over 35 percent.   Among men, the percentage 
of non-teachers earning less than the average teacher 
was noticeably lower throughout the 1940-2000 
period.  Male teachers also suﬀ ered a decline in relative 
pay, but instead of dropping throughout the period, 
male teachers’ relative pay fell between 1940 and 1960 
and then remained roughly constant.8
Economic theory suggests that the combination of 
more labor market opportunities for women and 
declining relative salaries would have a negative eﬀ ect 
on the quality of the individuals entering teaching.  We 
have already noted that the issue of what constitutes 
a quality teacher is a complicated one and that, for the 
most part, “input” measures have not proven to be very 
good indicators of teachers’ impacts on student achieve-
ment.  Th e exception to this general rule is that, of the 
teacher “input” characteristics that can be measured, 
cognitive skills as determined by tests of verbal and 
mathematical skills have been shown consistently to 
be positively related to student outcomes.9  Th us the 
question of whether teacher quality has declined has 
generally been examined by asking whether the verbal 
and mathematical skills of teachers have decreased 
relative to other test-takers.*
Th is indicator provides a mixed picture of changes 
in teacher quality. Based on data about the careers of 
women who graduated from high school at various 
point between 1957 and 1992, researchers found 
that the average rank of new teachers relative to 
non-teachers remained about the same:  On average 
teachers had test scores above those of the average high 
school graduate in their cohorts but below the average 
college graduate.  But the propensity of the highest-
scoring high school graduates to teach has changed 
dramatically.  In the 1960s 15-17 percent of women in 
the top 10 percent of their high school classes could be 
predicted to become teachers.  In the 1990s this fell to 
6-8 percent.  Th e same pattern was apparent among 
women in the top 10-30 percent.  High-aptitude men, 
on the other hand, were more likely to become teachers 
in the 1990s than in the 1960s, though this result has 
to be interpreted cautiously since sample sizes of male 
teachers and the number of male teachers are small.10  
Although higher-ability women did desert the class-
room in signiﬁ cant numbers, the large increase in 
female college graduates during the latter part of the 
20th century appears to have protected teaching from 
a decline in the average cognitive ability of those 
entering the profession.  It is unreasonable to expect 
another big jump in the pool of college-educated 
women, so competitive pressures may well have more 
negative eﬀ ects on schools in the future than they 
did in the past.  Th is emphasizes the importance of 
human capital policies to address the ongoing need for 
a large proportion of college-educated workers to be 
willing to teach.   
Tackling the Challenges of 
Compensation Reform
Pay and pension policies are important elements of the 
human capital agenda for improving teacher quality.  
Although designing new approaches to teacher com-
pensation poses challenges, it is important to undertake 
the task.  In our study we uncovered numerous ways 
in which existing teacher compensation systems are 
misaligned with the important goal of obtaining 
the highest quality teachers possible for America’s 
classrooms at the most eﬃ  cient cost to the taxpayer.  
We also discovered that, despite the challenges, there 
are practical reforms that can make compensation a 
more eﬀ ective strategic tool for meeting our schools’ 
human resource needs.
Business leaders need to become more knowledge-
able about and engaged in discussion about the 
compensation aspect of education’s human capital 
challenge.  Salaries and beneﬁ ts for staﬀ  engaged 
directly in instruction represent the largest expendi-
tures schools make:  during the 2004-05 school year 
they were 90 percent of expenditures on instruction 
and 55 percent of all current expenditures (excluding 
capital outlays).11  Th e current approach to teacher 
compensation is deeply embedded in both district and 
* Because of the limitations on the available measures of teachers’ cognitive ability, researchers are limited to asking how teacher quality deﬁ ned by this 
ability has changed relative to non-teachers.  Th e available measures do not permit analysis of how absolute levels of cognitive ability have changed over 
time.  If overall levels of cognitive skill are increasing, then it is possible that the cognitive ability of individuals entering teaching is increasing even if their 
test scores relative to non-teachers have declined.
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state education policies and practices.  Few members 
of the public beyond the immediate beneﬁ ciaries of 
compensation policies are knowledgeable enough about 
them to be eﬀ ective change agents.  Yet all of us have a 
strong stake in whether these policies are designed to 
attract and reward teachers who can help the nation 
reach the high learning goals it has for all students.
Business leaders have been ahead of their education 
colleagues in recognizing the importance of adapting 
their human resource policies to attract and retain 
talent in a more competitive and mobile labor market.  
Th ey also have a large stake in the success of American 
schools.  Th is report aims to help them and others 
understand current teacher compensation policies and 
their shortcomings, assess possible reforms and the 
issues and tradeoﬀ s involved, and become informed 
participants in the 50 states and 14,000 school dis-
tricts where these policies are ultimately debated and 
decided.
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Despite the fragmented and decentralized nature of 
American public education, there is a striking similar-
ity in the way states and districts pay their teachers.  
Virtually all rely on the so-called single salary schedule 
for current compensation, despite long-standing 
complaints about its problems.  Although many states 
and districts in recent years have made changes on the 
margins to address some of the single salary schedule’s 
shortcomings, only a handful of districts have actually 
replaced the schedule.  Denver is the most prominent 
example, having adopted a fundamentally diﬀ erent pay 
structure for all new teachers, as well as for current 
teachers who choose to opt into the system.
Th is chapter describes what the traditional single 
salary schedule is and what the major objections to it 
are.  We describe the Denver plan as evidence that a 
completely new pay structure for teachers, as opposed 
to adding bells and whistles to the current pay struc-
ture, is feasible.  We explain why we recommend that 
teacher performance (as measured by student learning), 
which is virtually ignored by the single salary schedule, 
should be an important component of teacher pay 
and what recent experience with pay-for-performance 
plans suggests about how to approach designing and 
implementing such plans.  We explore the possibility 
of redesigning the teaching job itself (through more 
explicit career tracks and through full-year employment 
options).  Th ese redesigned jobs could be accompanied 
by targeted pay raises to reward teachers who prove 
their eﬀ ectiveness over time with additional responsi-
bilities and opportunities for professional growth.  We 
also suggest ways in which the current salary structure 
can be modiﬁ ed to deal with staﬀ  shortages and other 
problems caused by the single salary schedule’s unre-
sponsiveness to labor market realities.  We conclude 
with the caution that, for pay redesign to be success-
ful, local jurisdictions must work through their own 
processes of developing alternative pay plans, rather 
than adopting a pre-existing plan from elsewhere or 
having one imposed on them.
CHAPTER 2:  Pay
The Single Salary Schedule and its 
Shortcomings
In the United States virtually all teachers are paid 
according to a pay scale commonly referred to as a 
“single salary schedule.”  In such schedules, which 
resemble traditional civil service pay schedules in other 
parts of the public sector, pay is determined exclusively 
by (1) years of experience and (2) academic credits and 
diplomas earned.  Th ese schedules are often referred to 
as having “steps and lanes.”  A typical salary schedule for 
teachers, in this case the schedule used by Denver for 
teachers who are not required and have not chosen to 
participate in the district’s new pay plan, is illustrated 
in Table 1.
Denver calls the longevity factor “steps”; in many 
districts the rows directly reﬂ ect years of experience.  A 
teacher moves from row to row down the salary sched-
ule as he or she gains more years of experience and can 
also move across the rows (“lanes”) as he or she obtains 
additional educational degrees and credentials.  Th e 
entire schedule itself is typically revised upward each 
year as school boards approve cost-of-living adjust-
ments which are applied to each cell in the schedule.  
Sometimes these adjustments are applied across the 
board.  In other cases, year-to-year adjustments to the 
speciﬁ c cells in the salary schedule may be variable.  
Th is might occur, for example, as part of a deliberate 
strategy to raise the relative pay of beginning teachers.
Some districts adopted single salary schedules early in 
the 20th century as a way of removing unfair discrimi-
nation (e.g., on the basis of sex or race) and political 
favoritism from the process of paying teachers.  By 
mid-century (before the spread of teacher unionism, 
it should be noted) virtually all districts paid their 
teachers using a single salary schedule.12  Unions came 
to defend the single salary schedule as the fairest way 
to set teacher pay.13  Some states embed teacher salary 
schedules in state law, establishing minimum, though 
not necessarily maximum, pay levels for each position.  
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Typically districts adopt pay scales that are higher than 
the state minima.  Th e amount of time that it takes a 
teacher to reach the top level on the scale depends on 
state and district policy, though it can amount to 20 or 
more years.  Once at the top of the scale, long-serving 
teachers may be limited to only cost-of-living increases. 
Although some districts have adapted the single 
salary schedule for teachers in various ways (e.g., 
to pay recruitment bonuses or to reward service in 
certain schools and subjects; to recognize exceptional 
performance; to compensate for additional duties 
performed), these modiﬁ cations have occurred un-
systematically and represent only marginal changes 
to teacher pay plans.  
Th e persistence of single salary schedules compli-
cates the task of improving America’s schools.
• Th ere is a “disconnect” between teacher pay and 
performance.  As school reform has increasingly 
focused on student learning outcomes rather than 
on educational inputs, there is growing criticism 
of the single salary schedule because it ignores 
teacher performance as a criterion for teacher pay.  
Table 1—Denver Public Schools – salary schedule effective 9/1/08
BA
BA+30
credits
BA+60 
credits or MA
MA+30 
credits
MA+60 
credits
Doctorate
Step 1 $36,635 $36,904 $37,172 $40,201 $40,949 $43,522
Step 2 $36,910 $37,257 $37,603 $40,555 $42,920 $45,609
Step 3 $37,013 $37,494 $39,099 $41,876 $44,666 $47,477
Step 4 $37,201 $37,697 $40,559 $43,471 $46,383 $49,308
Step 5 $37,539 $39,262 $42,283 $45,301 $48,339 $51,391
Step 6 $37,765 $40,930 $44,080 $47,216 $50,378 $53,578
Step 7 $39,357 $42,666 $45,930 $49,240 $52,509 $55,879
Step 8 $41,015 $44,437 $47,875 $51,331 $54,750 $58,276
Step 9 $42,731 $46,344 $49,916 $53,516 $57,146 $60,781
Step 10 $44,546 $48,313 $52,068 $55,830 $59,578 $63,398
Step 11 $46,427 $50,335 $54,271 $58,176 $62,136 $66,135
Step 12 $48,408 $52,486 $56,605 $60,732 $64,816 $68,981
Step 13 $50,882 $55,173 $59,610 $63,755 $68,068 $72,408
 Source: Denver Public Schools, 2008-2009 DCTA Salary Schedule, http://hr.dpsk12.org/pay/dcta.shtml (accessed May 21, 2009). 
Recent research has demonstrated that longevity 
and academic credits are not strong indicators 
of a teacher’s success in raising student achieve-
ment.14  New studies also show that there are 
real and identiﬁ able diﬀ erences in the impact that 
individual teachers have on student performance.15  
Individuals who believe they are or could be highly 
eﬀ ective teachers are faced with a salary structure 
that promises them no rewards for that eﬀ ective-
ness.  Instead, the only way to reach the higher 
levels of pay is to accumulate many years of experi-
ence.
• Th e single salary schedule contributes to per-
sistent teacher shortages in certain subjects and 
schools.  For decades schools have had a hard time 
ﬁ lling teaching positions in certain subjects, par-
ticularly in the sciences, mathematics, and special 
education.  Uniform salary schedules have long 
been held partially responsible, because individuals 
qualiﬁ ed to take these positions have many, often 
more lucrative, opportunities in the private-sector 
labor market. 16  Educational administrators 
cannot compete with these outside opportunities 
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by oﬀ ering diﬀ erential pay.  More recently it has 
become apparent that a uniform approach to pay 
also helps account for numerous ﬁ ndings that 
at-risk students in the most troubled schools and 
neighborhoods are usually taught by the least 
experienced and qualiﬁ ed teachers.17  Without 
the ability to oﬀ er extra pay to attract individuals 
to the hardest-to-serve schools, teachers exercise 
their seniority rights and select schools with higher 
ability students in education settings they ﬁ nd 
more appealing.18  
• Th e salary schedule has no incentives for 
instructionally eﬀ ective professional develop-
ment.  Although the single salary schedule rewards 
teachers for obtaining academic credits and 
degrees beyond the bachelor’s degree, most studies 
of the issue have not found evidence that these 
credits and advanced degrees contribute to raising 
student achievement, with the possible exception 
of high school math and science teachers.19  As 
they currently operate, salary policies create no 
incentives for teachers to participate in profes-
sional development programs that are targeted to 
their own or their school’s speciﬁ c needs.  In most 
places, teachers make independent decisions about 
what kinds of advanced study to pursue and are 
rewarded whether or not their choices are likely to 
make them more eﬀ ective in the classroom.   Not 
infrequently, for example, teachers receive pay raises 
for obtaining graduate degrees in administration, 
which may help qualify them for a career move 
out of the classroom but do nothing to boost their 
performance while they are still teaching.
• Th e salary schedule rewards years of experience 
that do not translate into improved student 
learning.   Along with advanced credentials, the 
other factor that moves teachers into higher-paying 
cells on the salary schedule is years of experience 
in a district’s schools.  Research on the connection 
between teacher experience and eﬀ ectiveness, 
however, suggests that experience leads to better 
student achievement only in the early years of a 
teacher’s career.  Just how much experience matters 
is unclear:  Most researchers ﬁ nd that teacher 
eﬀ ectiveness does not improve signiﬁ cantly after 
the ﬁ rst three to ﬁ ve years, while a few have found 
experience eﬀ ects for a longer period, though not 
eﬀ ects as large as in the ﬁ rst few years of teach-
ing.20  Salary schedules, however, generally reward 
experience for many years, as can be seen in the 
illustrative salary schedule in Table 1. 
Some argue that the problem with teacher pay is not 
that pay is based on a single salary schedule but rather 
that teacher pay is too low.  Th ey call for across-the-
board increases in pay.  We believe that such increases 
are neither an eﬃ  cient nor an eﬀ ective way to address 
the shortcomings of the current teacher pay system.  
Raising pay for all teachers would be quite expensive 
and would be as likely to encourage ineﬀ ective teachers 
as eﬀ ective ones to remain in the classroom.
Instead of across-the-board salary increases, we 
support paying selected teachers more in ways that 
directly address the problems with existing policies.  
We favor linking some part of pay to how eﬀ ective a 
teacher is in raising measured student performance.  As 
a later section shows, however, performance pay is a 
complicated issue and reform must be approached in a 
nuanced way that reﬂ ects the fact that much is still to 
be learned about how to design good plans.  In addition 
to performance-based pay, eﬀ ective teachers can also be 
rewarded through initiatives that redesign jobs to oﬀ er 
more deﬁ ned career tracks, and year-round employ-
ment opportunities for individuals who want them.  
Pay that reﬂ ects diﬀ erent labor market demands for 
individuals with diﬀ erent areas of expertise would also 
be a clear improvement over current arrangements. *
A Comprehensive New Pay Structure:  
Denver ProComp
Th e only sizeable school district that to date has 
replaced, rather than supplemented, the single salary 
schedule for all new teachers (and for those veterans 
who opt in) is Denver.  Th e district’s new pay plan, 
Professional Compensation for Teachers (ProComp), 
therefore provides the best available evidence that pay 
reform is possible, even in a unionized setting.  Denver 
also provides one example of how diﬀ erential pay for 
various aspects of teacher practice and performance can 
be combined in a new salary structure.21
Although ProComp has its origins in union/district 
discord—a 1999 impasse during collective bargaining 
* See Memorandum, p. 56.
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over linking teacher pay to student achievement—it 
became a model of how teachers and administrators 
could work together to achieve meaningful compensa-
tion reform.  Th e outcome of the 1999 negotiations was 
an agreement between Denver Public Schools (DPS) 
and the Denver Classroom Teachers Association 
(DCTA—a National Education Association aﬃ  liate) 
to pursue a four-year Pay-for-Performance Pilot.  Th e 
pilot was led by a design team composed of two teach-
ers and two administrators.  Th e team arranged with 
the Community Training Assistance Center of Boston 
to evaluate the pilot.  Based on the experiences of the 
design team and ﬁ ndings from the evaluation, DPS and 
DCTA concluded that compensation linked to student 
performance was feasible and acceptable to teachers but 
that a new teacher compensation agreement could not 
be based on student outcomes alone.
In 2001 DPS and DCTA formed a Joint Task Force 
on Teacher Compensation to design an equitable 
and aﬀ ordable salary system for teachers based in 
part on student achievement.  Th e task force had 
representation from a variety of stakeholders:  teachers, 
principals, central oﬃ  ce administrators and community 
members.  Th e task force made draft recommendations 
in the spring of 2003, which were extensively discussed 
with teachers and others.  Final recommendations were 
submitted to the DPS Board of Education and DCTA 
in early 2004 and a ﬁ nal plan was accepted in March.  
Th e next step was to win community support for a $25 
million tax levy from voters to support the program.  
Th at step was also carried out through vigorous com-
munity interaction and engaged city leaders such as 
the mayor as well as school oﬃ  cials.  Voters approved 
the levy in November 2005, and ProComp became 
mandatory for all teachers hired in 2006 and beyond.  
Teachers already in the Denver system had several 
windows during which they could choose to leave the 
traditional salary structure and opt into ProComp.
ProComp replaces the traditional schedule (which was 
shown in Table 1) with a new structure (see Table 2) 
that builds teachers’ salaries oﬀ  of a base index amount 
that increases over time as negotiated between DPS 
and DCTA.   Th e base amount for individual teachers 
is originally established by human resources teams.  
Teachers can earn salary increases (i.e., permanent 
increases in their base amounts) and one-time bonuses 
through nine elements falling under four general 
headings:
• Knowledge and skills
• Professional evaluation
• Student growth, measured both for individual 
teachers and for whole schools
• Market incentives, for service in hard-to serve 
schools and hard-to-staﬀ  subjects
Denver demonstrates not only the careful and col-
laborative process that most experts think is necessary 
for salary reform to work but also that redesigning 
pay systems should be regarded as a process, not a 
one-time event.  Denver was brieﬂ y in the news in the 
summer of 2008 when DPS and DCTA appeared to 
be heading to an impasse over changes to ProComp.  
District administrators wanted, in eﬀ ect, to change the 
weighting of some of ProComp’s elements, providing 
higher salaries for beginning teachers and increasing 
the amount of the market-based incentives.  Th e union 
objected to changes before an evaluation report due in 
2009 and also preferred that any increases be allocated 
to more teachers.  Agreement was ﬁ nally reached, but 
the episode showed how new pay structures designed 
to mesh more closely with educational objectives will 
inevitably need to evolve and change as those objec-
tives change.
Denver’s deliberate approach to reform provided ample 
opportunity to address the challenges that accompany 
eﬀ orts to design new forms of pay.
Performance-Based Pay*
Of the various new elements that might be included 
in a reformed teacher salary structure, creating a 
link between some part of teacher pay to improved 
outcomes for students is the most sensitive.  CED 
has supported such a link for some time; in our 2004 
report Investing in Learning, we said:
CED believes that teachers (and other educa-
tors), like virtually all other professionals, should 
be evaluated on how well they perform on the 
* By “performance-based pay” or “performance pay” we mean teacher pay that is linked to measures of student outcomes.  Learning is the most important 
of these outcomes; related measures sometimes include attendance and graduation rates.  “Performance pay” is sometimes used by others to refer to links 
between pay and teacher practice as measured by things like taking on additional responsibilities and working in hard-to-staﬀ  schools.  We refer to this 
practice-related pay as pay linked to career paths, and labor-market-based pay, respectively.
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job.  Some part of their pay should reﬂ ect this 
performance.  Good teachers should be rewarded 
ﬁ nancially; ineﬀ ective teachers who are unable to 
improve should not only see poor performance 
reﬂ ected in their pay but ultimately should be 
removed from the classroom.  We think that linking 
pay and performance is potentially one of the 
most important tools available to policy makers 
for encouraging strong candidates to enter teach-
ing (knowing that eﬀ ort and eﬀ ectiveness will be 
rewarded) and eﬀ ective teachers to remain in the 
classroom.22 
We also noted, however, that previous attempts to 
implement performance pay in education,  notably the 
“merit-pay” movement of the 1980s, were singularly 
unsuccessful and that the performance-pay policies 
which are widely used in the private sector are not 
immune to problems.  We urged that performance pay 
in education “be approached with honest acknowledge-
ment of the real challenges in implementing it.”23
Events in the intervening ﬁ ve years give us cause for 
hope that performance pay can become a construc-
tive element in teacher compensation.  Reformers 
must be careful, however, to avoid letting the idea’s 
new-found political popularity get ahead of our 
technical knowledge about how to design and imple-
ment performance-pay designs.  
In this section we describe performance pay, report on 
a number of new eﬀ orts to incorporate performance 
pay into teacher compensation, note some encouraging 
ways in which these new eﬀ orts diﬀ er from earlier 
failed merit pay initiatives, oﬀ er some cautionary tales 
about how well-meaning performance-pay initiatives 
can go awry, and indicate how we believe schools and 
districts should approach performance pay going 
forward.
An Overview of Performance Pay
By performance pay we mean pay that rewards teachers’ 
eﬀ ectiveness as measured by improvements in student 
learning.  
Table 3 outlines a number of ways that such rewards 
can be structured.  Some indicators of performance 
are based on group measures and some on individual 
accomplishments.  Th e performance reward strategies 
are not mutually exclusive and in fact are most likely 
to be eﬀ ective when combined.  While we believe that 
student outcomes should be the key element in teacher 
rewards, the table reﬂ ects the fact that various kinds of 
performance award programs have used an assortment 
of performance measures, including quantitative mea-
sures (e.g., student test scores, measures of attendance) 
as well as qualitative measures such as those resulting 
from classroom evaluations by supervisors or by peers 
as well as supervisors. 
Table 3 also begins to suggest some of the potential 
pitfalls in fairly and accurately measuring teacher 
eﬀ ectiveness.  In fact, measuring performance for 
the purpose of providing ﬁ nancial rewards raises 
many concerns about intended and unintended 
consequences.  Group awards (for example, to all 
the teachers in a school that is successful in raising 
student performance, or to all the teachers in a ﬁ eld 
of study where student performance improves) have 
the advantage of encouraging teachers to collaborate 
with one another.  On the other hand, group awards 
are vulnerable to what economists call the “free-rider” 
problem; some teachers may not carry their weight 
but will be rewarded anyway if the group performs 
well.  Individual rewards avoid this problem; but if the 
number of awards is limited, they can foster an un-
desirable competition among teachers and discourage 
individuals from helping each other to improve instruc-
tion.  All performance measures based on student test 
scores raise questions about whether the reward system 
will encourage teachers to focus too narrowly on tested 
subjects and give short shrift to subject areas where 
standardized tests are not routinely given.  Since many 
subject areas are not routinely tested (the federal No 
Child Left Behind law, for example, requires testing 
only in reading, mathematics, and science), test-based 
reward systems that do not reward an entire school 
have to address the question of how teachers in non-
tested subjects can earn performance rewards.
Beyond these challenges, the methodological issues 
in measuring student performance, whether for pay 
calculations or for other accountability purposes, 
are substantial.  It is widely acknowledged that simply 
measuring the level of student performance (e.g., how 
many students pass a test; what the average test score 
is) does not reﬂ ect teacher performance.  Student 
performance is related to many factors besides what 
a teacher does.  Test scores are highly correlated, for 
example, with family background variables that indicate 
relative socio-economic advantage and disadvantage.  
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Performance Reward 
Strategy
Target: 
Individual 
Or Group
Illustrative Performance 
Measures
Possible 
Form of 
Reward
Strengths Weaknesses
Whole-School 
Reward
Group
Student test scores
Student attendance
Teacher attendance
Other?
Annual 
bonus
Reinforce 
collaborative 
effort
Limited empirical 
measures 
could result in 
narrowing of 
curriculum
Free rider 
problem
Specialists/Teaching-
Team Reward ( e.g., 
All math teachers in 
a school, a district, a 
region, or a state)
Group
Student test scores
Student attendance
Teacher attendance
Other?
Annual 
bonus
Reinforces 
collaborative 
effort
Reduces free- 
rider problem
Limited empirical 
measures 
could result in 
narrowing of 
curriculum
The larger the 
group, the more 
likely there is a 
free rider issue
Teacher Value-
Added Reward
Individual Student test scores
Annual 
bonus
Base pay 
addition
Possibly enhances 
instructor 
motivation
Ties reward 
directly to 
teacher impact 
on student 
achievement
Limited empirical 
measures 
could result in 
narrowing of 
curriculum
Could foster 
dysfunctional 
competition
Teacher Appraisal-
Based Reward
Individual
Peer or peer and 
superior appraisals of 
teacher performance
Bonus
Base pay 
addition
Diminishes 
dysfunctional 
consequences of 
test score reliance
Few empirically 
validated 
appraisal 
dimensions
Fear of favoritism 
and cronyism
Teacher Career 
Ladder
Individual
Peer or peer and 
superior appraisals of 
teacher performance
Student test scores
Student attendance
Teacher attendance
Knowledge and skills
Bonus
Base pay 
addition
Rewards 
instruction
 
Keeps strong 
teachers in 
the classroom 
by providing 
opportunities for 
promotion
Limited success in 
practice
Source:  Adapted from Janet S. Hansen, “Measuring Teacher Eﬀ ectiveness,” presentation to the Research to Action Forum sponsored by the Regional 
Education Laboratory Midwest ( January 24, 2007).
Table 3—Illustrative ways of rewarding teacher performance
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If just the level of student performance is considered, 
teachers who have more advantaged students in their 
classes would appear to be the most eﬀ ective, when in 
fact a teacher with lower-performing students may have 
had more success in raising his or her students’ achieve-
ment.
For such reasons, it is generally agreed that measuring 
gains in, rather than levels of, student performance is 
a fairer way of assessing the impact of teachers.  Th e 
most desirable measure identiﬁ es the portion of that 
gain (the “value added”) due to the teacher rather than 
to other inﬂ uences.
But measuring value added involves additional 
methodological challenges.  For one thing, teachers 
are not randomly assigned to schools or to classrooms 
within schools.  Instead, the students in a teacher’s 
classroom may reﬂ ect things like teacher preferences to 
teach in schools with lots of high-performing students 
or parents of higher achieving students successfully 
inﬂ uencing schools to assign their children to certain 
teachers.  In addition, it is technically and conceptually 
diﬃ  cult to separate the eﬀ ects of individual teachers 
from the eﬀ ects of other inputs to the educational 
process, including the background characteristics of 
students and their families.  Finally, there are serious 
problems of statistical measurement error that can 
make estimates of teacher eﬀ ects, especially over a short 
period such as just one year, imprecise.24  Measurement 
error, which can result in rewarding the “wrong” teach-
ers, is a concern in both individual and group award 
plans. 
Education is not alone in facing challenges when 
attempting to use quantitative measures to reward em-
ployee performance.  Richard Rothstein has identiﬁ ed 
numerous instances (in health care, job training, and 
Soviet-era economic planning, to name a few) when ﬁ -
nancial incentives rewarding certain behaviors distorted 
program goals and sometimes led to corruption.  He 
provides many examples of the operation of Donald T. 
Campbell’s “law” of performance measurement:
Th e more any quantitative social indicator is used 
for social decision-making, the more subject it will 
be to corruption pressures and the more apt it will 
be to distort and corrupt the social processes it is 
intended to monitor.25  
In the private sector, Beer and Cannon note a 
widespread and growing use of pay-for-performance 
plans but also tell the story of one company, Hewlett-
Packard, that tried and then abandoned such plans in 
the 1990s for reasons not unique to that organization.26 
Others have also commented on diﬃ  culties in imple-
menting private-sector performance-pay schemes.27
A number of initiatives are underway around the 
country that can provide evidence we currently lack 
about how to design pay plans that reward teachers 
for genuine eﬀ ectiveness and in which teachers will 
have conﬁ dence.  
Current Performance-Pay Initiatives
A handful of states and districts have had performance-
pay plans in place for a number of years.  Dallas, Texas, 
initiated an accountability and incentive system in the 
1991-1992 school year that ranked schools annually 
based on improvements in students’ test performance 
(as well as some non-test measures such as attendance) 
and provided ﬁ nancial bonuses for all the staﬀ  in the 
highest performing schools.  North Carolina’s “ABCs 
of Public Education” program, launched in school year 
1996-97, included among its features pay bonuses 
for staﬀ  in schools that exceeded expectations for the 
performance of their students.
Th e last several years, however, have seen a surge 
of interest in such plans, especially notable among 
state and federal policy makers.  In addition to the 
performance-pay component of Denver ProComp, 
some other prominent examples of initiatives that focus 
on or include performance pay include:
Houston Independent School District ASPIRE 
program.  Houston operates the nation’s largest 
district-level performance-pay program.  Launched in 
2006 and now part of a larger comprehensive educa-
tion initiative called ASPIRE (Accelerating Student 
Progress, Increasing Results & Expectations), the 
ASPIRE Award Program rewards teachers based on 
improvements in student test scores.  All teachers and 
support staﬀ  are eligible for awards.  Th e program 
includes both individual teacher and school-wide 
bonuses.  Nine diﬀ erent “sections” or types of teach-
ers and staﬀ  are identiﬁ ed, based on responsibilities; 
individuals in each section are eligible for one or more 
“strands” of awards.  So, for example, teachers of core 
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subjects who lead self-contained classrooms in grades 
3-6 are eligible for all strands of awards (including both 
individual and school-wide bonuses), while non-core 
teachers (for example, those who teach elective sub-
jects) are only eligible for school-wide bonuses.  For 
results in school year 2008-09, a teacher eligible for 
all award strands could receive as much as $10,300.   
Funds for the bonuses come from local, state, federal, 
and foundation sources.28
Florida Merit Award Program.  In its latest eﬀ ort 
to create performance pay for teachers (more on this 
history below), Florida established the Merit Award 
Program (MAP) in 2007.  Districts who choose 
to participate and meet program guidelines can 
receive funds from the state for teacher bonuses.  All 
instructional staﬀ  and school-based administrators 
are eligible for awards that must be based primarily 
on student performance as measured by standardized 
tests.  Principal evaluations can also be considered.  
Districts can reward teacher teams as well as individual 
teachers, and districts can determine student perfor-
mance using both learning gains and proﬁ ciency levels 
(that is, student achievement at one point in time).  
Bonuses can amount to 5 to 10 percent of the average 
teacher salary in each district, which means that 
less-experienced teachers with lower salaries can earn 
proportionately higher awards.  Interestingly, Florida 
districts are subject to a previous state law requiring 
them to base a portion of teacher pay on teacher 
performance, whether or not the district participates in 
MAP.  Nonparticipating districts do not receive state 
funding for performance pay.29  
Minnesota Quality Compensation for Teachers 
(Q-Comp) program.   Approved by the Minnesota 
Legislature in 2005, QComp is a voluntary program 
that allows school districts and teachers to receive state 
funds to implement locally designed and collectively 
bargained compensation plans that include ﬁ ve state-
mandated components.  Th ese components are (1) 
career ladders/advancement options; (2) job-embedded 
professional development; (3) teacher evaluation; (4) 
performance pay based in part on student academic 
achievement; and (5) an alternative salary schedule.   
Th e state provides $169 per student to each participat-
ing district to implement QComp; the district has 
the option of providing up to $91 per student more 
by implementing a special levy.  As of March 2009 44 
out of 339 school districts and 27 charter schools had 
received state approval to implement the program, 
according to a Minnesota Department of Education 
press release.30
Texas Governor’s Educator Excellence Award 
Program.   Texas’s governor launched the state’s current 
performance-pay initiative in 2005 with an Executive 
Order committing at least $10 million annually from 
federal education dollars allotted to Texas to a three-
year grant program (Governor’s Educator Excellence 
Grant—GEEG) providing performance pay for teach-
ers in eligible schools.  Th e latter were high-performing 
schools serving high percentages of economically 
disadvantaged students.  Of 100 eligible schools, 99 
participated in the program, which ended in 2007-09.  
Meanwhile, the Legislature approved a similar, larger 
program (Texas Educator Excellence Grant—TEEG) 
to provide state awards to eligible schools, and a 
district-oriented program (District Awards for Teacher 
Excellence—DATE) in which all districts in the state 
may participate.  Both TEEG and DATE require that a 
majority of program funds be used for teacher bonuses 
based on student achievement.  Schools and districts 
develop their own plans following state guidelines.  
Participating DATE districts (203 of 1031 in 2008-
09) are responsible for a 15 percent match in funds or 
in kind.  Th rough GEEG, TEEG, and DATE, the state 
has as of 2009 provided approximately $247 million 
for schools and districts to develop performance-pay 
plans, making Texas’s statewide performance-pay 
eﬀ orts the largest in the nation.31
Federal Teacher Incentive Fund Program.  In 2006, 
the federal government established the Teacher 
Incentive Fund (TIF) program to support the devel-
opment and implementation of performance-based 
teacher and principal compensation systems in high-
needs schools (based on measures of student poverty).  
States, school districts, charter schools, and partner-
ships including states and/or districts and one or more 
non-proﬁ t groups may apply.  Grants can be made 
for up to ﬁ ve years.  Grant recipients develop their 
own compensation systems, but performance-based 
compensation must be based primarily on student 
achievement.  Over the period of the grant, grantees 
are expected to pick up an increasing share of the costs 
of diﬀ erential compensation.  As of March 2009 34 
TIF grants have been made, some to large districts 
amounting to over $20 million for ﬁ ve years.  Th e ﬁ scal 
stimulus bill approved by Congress in February 2009 
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includes a sizeable increase in TIF funding.  In addi-
tion to providing TIF grants, the federal Department 
of Education also created the Center for Educator 
Compensation Reform to provide technical assistance 
to TIF grantees and an online repository of informa-
tion and tools to help in the design and implementation 
of compensation reform programs and practices.*
Why Performance Pay Could be More Successful 
this Time Around
One of the obstacles to widespread adoption of perfor-
mance pay in education is the fact that there are still a 
lot of people who remember the singularly unsuccessful 
eﬀ orts to implement “merit pay” in the 1980s.  Th e 
1983 federal report A Nation at Risk condemned the 
quality of American schools in strong language and 
called, among other things, for performance-based 
pay.32   In its wake, a number of districts adopted 
some form of merit pay.  Most of these initiatives were 
short-lived.  Th e few that survived tended to evolve into 
rewards for teachers who took on extra work rather 
than those who performed best.  Merit pay developed a 
terrible reputation among teachers.  Th e plans suf-
fered from problems establishing criteria for teacher 
eﬀ ectiveness; a belief that awards were made on unfair 
and arbitrary grounds; fears that pay bonuses, which 
were often restricted to a small proportion of teachers, 
would lead to competition rather than teamwork; and 
unstable and unreliable funding, which bred cynicism 
about how important pay for performance programs 
really were to the administrators and policy makers 
who adopted them.33
Researchers at Vanderbilt University who are studying 
the new round of performance pay initiatives believe 
that there are a number of diﬀ erences between the 
1980s merit pay programs and more recent initiatives 
that could increase the chances that the new plans will 
have a permanent eﬀ ect on the structure of teacher pay.  
Table 4 captures these diﬀ erences.
Several points in this table are noteworthy.  Th e 1980s 
eﬀ orts were fragmentary, involving a small number of 
districts, while current initiatives have garnered more 
widespread interest.  Signiﬁ cantly, progress has been 
made since the 1980s on developing both quantita-
tive and qualitative measures of student learning, 
although more remains to be done.  Th e absence of 
measures that teachers perceived as fair and objective 
was a key weakness of the “merit-pay” era.  In recent 
years, some teacher union aﬃ  liates at the local level 
have been willing to work collaboratively with district 
oﬃ  cials on performance-pay designs, sometimes in 
the face of opposition from national union leaders.34   
Growing numbers of teachers, especially younger ones, 
appear to be favorably inclined toward performance 
pay.   When asked about “merit pay” in a 2003 Public 
Agenda survey, for example, younger teachers were less 
concerned than their older peers that such pay would 
result in principals playing favorites or school climates 
that were more competitive than collaborative.  Younger 
teachers were also noticeably more receptive to merit 
pay based on principal evaluations, though they shared 
with older teachers a distaste for ﬁ nancial incentives for 
teachers whose students routinely scored higher than 
similar students on standardized tests.35
Cautionary Tales About Performance-Pay Initiatives
Nevertheless, it is no sure thing that attempts to make 
teacher pay more reﬂ ective of teacher eﬀ ectiveness will 
ultimately be more successful this time.  Poorly de-
signed and/or poorly implemented performance-pay 
plans may squander support for reforms and cause 
them to go the way of “merit pay.”  Evidence from two 
of the high-proﬁ le performance-pay eﬀ orts described 
earlier highlights the danger and demonstrates the need 
to design performance-pay plans carefully and col-
laboratively and to be open to mid-course corrections 
when initial designs prove problematic.
Th e Houston Independent School District’s new pay 
plan had a rocky beginning.36  It was planned over a 
relatively short one-year period, largely within the 
HISD research department.  Although teacher input 
was solicited, teacher representatives did not view their 
involvement as authentic and perceived the district as 
taking a unilateral, top-down approach to development. 
Within the district administration itself, the develop-
ment process did not involve meaningful communica-
tion or collaboration among central oﬃ  ce departments, 
so there was little sense of shared ownership of the new 
initiative.
* Th e center’s extensive array of information on educator compensation is online at http://www.cecr.ed.gov.
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Awards were initially made on the basis of complex, 
internally-derived value-added calculations of student 
achievement with apparently little eﬀ ort during the 
design phase to ensure that teachers understood 
how the bonuses were determined.   Th e ﬁ rst set of 
awards in January 2007 engendered a great deal of bad 
publicity and bad feeling.  Teachers, especially those 
who did not get awards or who were ineligible for 
individual awards, viewed the new plan as divisive and 
unfair.  Teachers with little quantitative background 
did not understand the award formula.  Teachers could 
not get access to the data that formed the basis for 
award decisions, even though some who did not get 
awards compiled evidence from sources that seemed 
to show their students had performed better than 
those of some award winners.  A local newspaper took 
advantage of open records laws and posted individual 
awards by name on its website, sometimes even before 
individual teachers had been notiﬁ ed.  Due to a compu-
tational error, some part-time teachers were mistakenly 
awarded bonuses, part of which they later had to repay.
Houston has moved in subsequent years to address 
many of these issues.  Communication eﬀ orts were 
Table 4—Merit pay and performance pay comparisons
Characteristics of
Reform Effort
1980s Merit Pay
2000s Performance 
Pay/Strategic Compensation
Locus of Initiative
Local School District 
Administration
Local, State, Federal Policy and Foundation Agendas
Inducements Rhetorical/Bully Pulpit State, Federal, and Philanthropic Cost Sharing
Politics Local High Politics (Executive, Legislative, and Party)
Performance Measurement Idiosyncratic/Subjective
Generally Objective (e.g., State Standards/ State 
Assessments)
Union Posture Strongly Opposed Mixed
Reward Target Individual Educators Individuals and Groups
Reward Amount Often Trivial Trivial to Quite Signifi cant
Magnitude 100 Local Districts 20+States/1,500+ Local Districts
Public Visibility Low Moderate and Increasing
Source:  James W. Guthrie, Patrick J. Shuermann, and Peter J. Witham, “Strategic Compensation:  A National Perspective,” presented to the District 
Award for Teacher Excellence Grantees Conference, Austin, TX (November 2-3, 2008).
stepped up.  Th e superintendent clariﬁ ed that teachers 
could opt out of the program if they wished.  Th e 
district formed an advisory panel of teachers to work 
with district oﬃ  cials and national experts to improve 
the performance-pay design.  Th e district replaced 
its own value-added calculation with the nationally-
known Educational Value-Added Assessment System 
(EVAAS) developed by Dr. William Sanders.  A 
revamped performance-pay program, the ASPIRE 
Award Program, was adopted by the school board in 
September 2007.  It moved away from its predecessor’s 
individual award emphasis to include group awards as 
well, which widened the pool of eligible bonus winners 
to include teachers and other instructional staﬀ  for 
whom individual student achievement scores were not 
available.  Th e district sought foundation funding to 
help to develop and manage the student achievement 
data for determining awards, to develop better informa-
tion and communication channels, and to train teachers 
and administrators on how to use performance data to 
inform planning and instruction.
Houston’s experience launching a performance-pay 
plan gave the district important insights into the 
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importance of communication, of balancing trans-
parency and complexity in developing understand-
able and fair award formulas, and of making clear 
how performance pay ﬁ ts as part of a larger eﬀ ort to 
improve teacher quality.
Florida’s recent history oﬀ ers another cautionary tale 
about the perils of creating performance-pay plans that 
appear hastily designed and that garner little support 
from teachers and administrators.37  
State legislators passed laws in the late 1990s that 
required districts to evaluate teachers annually and to 
use evaluations based primarily on student learning 
gains to award bonuses.  Districts were given substan-
tial ﬂ exibility in designing their programs, but they 
had to provide bonuses worth 5 percent of a teacher’s 
individual salary.  Bonus money had to come from 
existing district personnel funds; no state dollars were 
provided for the extra pay.
In February 2006 the state education commissioner, 
unhappy about district resistance to meeting the 
statutory requirement for teacher bonuses, presented 
a plan called E-Comp to the state Board of Education, 
spelling out how districts should implement the 
existing performance-pay requirement.  Th e board 
adopted E-Comp as an administrative rule.  E-Comp 
called for identifying outstanding teachers based solely 
on student learning gains using where possible the 
Florida Comprehensive Achievement Test (FCAT).  
Districts had to award bonuses worth 5 percent of pay 
to at least 10 percent of teachers.  Th e commissioner 
planned to ask the state for $55 million to implement 
the program but stated that districts would have to 
fund the program themselves if state funding was not 
forthcoming.
E-Comp was never implemented.  A number of objec-
tions immediately arose.  Teachers complained about 
the lack of stakeholder involvement in designing the 
program and about its reliance on the FCAT.  Th ey 
also objected to the arbitrariness of the decision to 
reward 10 percent of teachers.  Administrators noted 
that the program rules gave them only about four 
months to develop a local plan, negotiate it with the 
teachers union (under collective bargaining require-
ments), and seek and receive state approval.  
By May 2006 the legislature had acted to replace 
E-Comp with the Special Teachers Are Rewarded 
(STAR) program.  STAR reduced the reliance on the 
FCAT by giving a greater role to principal evaluations 
and extended the timeline for districts to develop and 
negotiate local plans.  STAR increased the proportion 
of teachers to be rewarded from 10 to 25 percent, 
although it kept the mandate that bonuses be worth 5 
percent of salary.  Th e legislature appropriated $147.5 
million for STAR awards in the 2006-07 state budget, 
although funding to districts was contingent on having 
a state-approved plan.
By the time initial district plans were due to the state 
in March 2007, one-third of the state’s 67 districts had 
rejected the program and another 15-20 had submitted 
plans that their teachers had rejected in order to qualify 
for state funds.  Since STAR required districts to base 
at least 50 percent of teacher performance evaluations 
on student learning gains, districts had to ﬁ gure out 
how to determine performance for teachers of courses 
where FCAT or other readily-available standardized 
tests were unavailable.  Th is meant developing many 
new tests (FCAT applied to only about half the teach-
ers in the state) and quickly evaluating test validity and 
reliability, which created problems for many districts.  
Teachers and their unions objected to what they saw 
as an ever heavier reliance on testing and worried that 
STAR would encourage competition and discourage 
collaboration among teachers.  Some districts felt that 
the revisions included in STAR still failed to give them 
suﬃ  cient discretion to design local plans.
Even as the state was allocating the ﬁ rst STAR funding 
to districts with approved plans in March 2007, the 
lack of support for the new program led the legislature 
to pass the Merit Award Program to replace STAR.  
Districts were given the option to participate in 
MAP, although they would not receive state funding 
for performance pay if they did not.  MAP also gave 
districts more ﬂ exibility in deciding on the size of 
bonuses and the proportion of teachers to be awarded 
and allowed them to reward teacher teams as well as 
individual teachers.  While some additional ﬂ exibility 
was included in terms of how test performance would 
be measured, the proportion of a teacher’s bonus that 
would be based on student achievement was raised to 
60 percent.  
Despite the changes from STAR to MAP, performance 
pay has continued to be unpopular with many Florida 
teachers; and districts have continued to struggle with 
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implementation and uncertainties over state funding.  
A recent study commissioned by the state Board of 
Education to help it cope with the current ﬁ scal crisis 
reported that in February 2009 only 5 of 67 public 
school districts, along with 218 of 358 charter schools, 
had submitted compliant plans to the state.38  Th e 
report recommended that the legislature consider 
further alterations to the program, including providing 
state bonuses directly to teachers as opposed to making 
bonuses contingent on districts’ ability to negotiate 
performance-pay arrangements with their unions.  Th e 
authors also recommended allowing districts to replace 
state bonuses with awards of their own design if they 
could reach acceptable agreements with their local 
teachers.  
While progress toward performance pay in Florida has 
been slow, it is worth noting that all Florida districts 
remain under a requirement to include consideration 
of performance in their teacher pay plans.  Several large 
districts (e.g., Hillsborough County, including Tampa, 
and Duval County, including Jacksonville) have MAP-
approved plans, and others have performance-pay 
arrangements but do not participate in MAP.
Th ese kinds of experiences cause us and many 
others39 to believe that successfully linking pay to 
performance in education must still be understood 
as a work in progress that requires much more 
experimentation with alternative pay design, careful 
evaluation, and an implementation process compat-
ible with adaptation and continuous improvement 
of performance-pay plans.  Th e eﬀ ort is worth it, as 
the limited research available to date supports the 
idea that performance pay can lead to better learning 
outcomes for students.40
Moving Forward with Teacher Performance Pay
Despite some stumbles, recent experience provides 
encouraging evidence that some states and districts 
are ﬁ nding ways to make student learning a factor 
in determining teacher pay.  Modiﬁ ed or alternative 
salary structures are still, however, the exception rather 
than the rule.  In the 2003-04 school year, only 8 
percent of districts reported using incentives to reward 
excellence in teaching.41  Th e number is certainly higher 
now, but many districts still need to move away from 
their narrow focus on years of experience and aca-
demic credentials in determining teacher pay.
As they do so, they can learn from the experiences of 
states and districts already implementing performance 
pay, both in terms of program design and in terms of 
political lessons such as the importance of working 
with teachers from the beginning in developing new 
pay arrangements.
We are struck in particular by an important ﬁ nding 
from the academic research on the use of value-added 
test scores for determining teacher pay.  As noted 
earlier, this research indicates that student test scores 
are “noisy”* and therefore are unstable measures of 
individual teacher eﬀ ectiveness when considered 
over a short period like a year.  Th is raises questions 
about the desirability of basing individual teacher 
pay on single-year measures of student performance.  
Over several years, however, test scores become more 
stable and reliable indicators of which teachers are 
successful in improving student achievement.
We also note that our own experience in business and 
academia, where qualitative as well as quantitative 
evaluations of individual performance are common, 
aligns with research ﬁ ndings that the most and the 
least eﬀ ective teachers as veriﬁ ed by student test scores 
can be identiﬁ ed through more subjective principal 
evaluations.42  Such evaluations, whether conducted by 
principals or by other administrators or teachers, have 
the added advantage of being able to take into account 
a broader range of teacher performance and educational 
objectives than test-score performance alone.  Th e nar-
rowness of test scores is a major reason why teachers 
often object to performance-based pay.
Th ese ﬁ ndings suggest that multi-year assessments 
of teacher performance based on both student 
achievement results and qualitative evaluations could 
be more eﬀ ective (and less controversial) methods 
of rewarding individual teacher performance than 
programs that rely solely on year-to-year changes in 
student test scores.  We propose in the next section 
one approach to building such elements into a new pay 
structure designed around more explicit teacher career 
paths.
* Statisticians refer to data as noisy when the data are characterized by a large amount of random error rather than systematic relationships among the 
variables being studied.
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Pay Linked to Career Paths
One long-standing observation about the career of 
teaching is that it is ﬂ at—“a teacher is a teacher.”  
Regardless of how long an individual has been on the 
job or how eﬀ ective he or she is, a teacher generally 
cannot receive formal recognition and pay for profes-
sional advancement without leaving the classroom 
for an administrative position.  While individual 
teachers may be able to qualify for supplementary 
payments for taking on extra responsibilities such as 
mentoring new teachers, an individual entering the 
profession has no clear pathway to advancement if he 
or she wants to remain in the classroom.
In the private sector, white-collar workers often are 
rewarded for strong performance by being promoted, 
rather than through annual performance-pay incre-
ments tied to speciﬁ c quantitative measures of results.43 
Developing career paths along which teachers could 
progress based in part on both qualitative and quan-
titative measures of their performance over time 
is a promising way to address both the ﬂ at-career 
problem and the limitations of one-year test scores 
as measures of how eﬀ ective a teacher is in improv-
ing student learning.  Th is could be a means of 
signiﬁ cantly raising pay for high-performing teachers 
while not resorting to ineﬃ  cient and expensive, but 
all too often used, across-the-board pay increases.   
A reform with some of the characteristics of what we 
are proposing was undertaken in a number of states 
in the mid-1980s under the label “career ladder.”  At 
least six states* launched programs that created career 
steps for teachers based in part on evaluations of their 
teaching.   
For the most part, these programs either failed to 
survive or did not become signiﬁ cant alternatives to the 
single salary schedule.  State unwillingness to provide 
suﬃ  cient funding for all the steps was one reason.  In 
addition, teachers were often skeptical of the appraisal 
systems being used.  North Carolina and Texas never 
fully funded their programs and had ended them 
by 1994.  Tennessee’s program was gone by the late 
1990s and never succeeded in its intention of including 
student achievement in the evaluation of teachers. 44  
Missouri’s program continues, but it does not replace 
the single salary schedule for participating teachers.  
Rather it operates more as a vehicle for giving teachers 
supplementary pay for extra work or for participation 
in career development activities.  Although the program 
appears linked to performance in that teachers are 
evaluated for promotion up the ladder, which qualiﬁ es 
them to take on additional responsibilities at higher 
rates of pay, in fact almost all the career-ladder teachers 
are given supplemental pay based on their performance 
evaluations.45  Arizona's ongoing career ladder program 
does replace the traditional salary schedule for partici-
pating teachers and requires student achievement to be 
a factor in teacher promotion.  Only 28 of more than 
200 school districts participate, however.  Apparently 
at least in part for funding reasons, no new districts 
have been allowed into the program since school year 
1993-94.
Lessons can be learned from the career ladder 
movement about how to design more eﬀ ective and 
sustainable career path programs for teachers.  Th e 
well-known Teacher Advancement Program (TAP), 
while not replacing the traditional salary structure, uses 
career paths as one component of its school reform 
model designed to “attract, retain, develop, and motivate 
talented people to the teaching profession.”  TAP 
schools currently serve over 70,000 students and 6,000 
teachers (See Figure 2).46
Interest in developing career paths for teachers is also 
growing internationally.  Singapore has proceeded 
further than most in developing a system of career 
tracks as part of a more comprehensive approach to 
attracting, recognizing, and rewarding high-performing 
classroom teachers (See Figure 3).
Jack Dale, the Superintendent of the Fairfax County 
(VA) Public Schools, advocates a somewhat diﬀ erent 
and interesting approach to teacher pathways.  In his 
district he has launched a pilot program that embraces 
full-year jobs for teachers who want and qualify for 
them.  Dale argues:
Teaching is a full-time profession and can no longer 
be viewed under an ‘hourly’ employment paradigm 
of so many hours per day and so many days per 
year… Th e new model I propose is based on teach-
ers’ opting for and being selected into one of many role 
options.  Th e options include not only the current 
* Arizona, Missouri, North Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Utah.
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set of teaching responsibilities—the traditional 
role—but also an additional set of role options 
that would form the core of the redesigned school 
system47 (emphasis added). 
In Dale’s plan, there would be diﬀ erent work calendars 
for diﬀ erent roles, but all except the traditional role 
would make teaching a year-round occupation, with 11 
months on duty and a month oﬀ .  New roles include, 
in addition to normal teaching duties, such things as 
“school-improvement teacher leader” (sharing leader-
ship responsibilities with the principal); “new-teacher 
trainer/mentor” (training new teachers before school 
starts and mentoring new staﬀ  during the school year); 
and “student-transition leader” (analyzing individual 
Figure 2—The Teacher 
Advancement Program (TAP)
TAP is “a multi-faceted strategy that restructures 
schools in order to improve the teaching profes-
sion.”  Th e program was created by Lowell Milken 
and the Milken Family Foundation in the late 
1990s in response to a “teacher quality crisis” that 
promised to leave too many students without 
the talented teachers needed to provide a high-
quality education to all children.  TAP takes a 
comprehensive approach to improving the teach-
ing workforce.  Although participating schools 
adapt the program to their individual needs, TAP 
emphasizes four key elements:
– Multiple career paths
– Ongoing, applied professional growth
– Instructionally focused accountability
– Performance-based compensation
TAP teachers are classiﬁ ed as career, mentor, and 
master teachers.  Mentor and master teachers are 
chosen through a competitive, performance-based 
process.  Th ey take on additional responsibilities 
and authority and are expected to work a longer 
school year.  Th ey are held to higher performance 
standards than are career teachers, which is 
reﬂ ected in higher compensation levels.
Source:  Teacher Advancement Program website, 
http://www.talentedteachers.org (accessed March 31, 2009).
students’ academic and social progress and coordinating 
support service for children needing extra help). 
Dale sees these new roles ﬂ owing from a new view of 
school structure that emphasizes a shared-leadership 
rather than a traditional hierarchical model.  Th e new 
model would give teachers more formal responsibilities 
as leaders and decision-makers within their schools.  
Dale believes that such a wholesale restructuring of 
teacher work and compensation, rather than the 
typical piecemeal changes, are necessary for schools 
to operate eﬀ ectively in today’s high-stakes, high-
standards-for-all environment.  He also argues that 
a reorganized school structure is needed “if we hope to 
compensate professional teachers for the full-time set 
of duties that are now part of the profession.”
Opportunities for promotion within teaching and for 
year-round employment are important approaches 
worth trying.  A desirable teacher compensation 
system is not just one that appeals to individuals cur-
rently attracted to teaching, but one that will draw 
in other talented individuals who may now shun the 
profession because of its limited opportunities for 
advancement and for pay commensurate with full-
year responsibilities.  
Labor-Market-Based Pay
By labor-market-based pay, we mean pay that is 
responsive to labor market realities such as diﬀ erential 
demand for and supply of teachers by subject area 
and diﬀ erential preferences by teachers for where they 
teach.  As various observers have noted,48 the eﬀ ects 
of diﬀ erences in supply and demand in teacher labor 
markets cannot be wished away.  If pay policies do 
not take them into account, labor market realities 
will be reﬂ ected in other ways, most likely by reduc-
ing the quality of teachers available for diﬀ erent 
assignments.   Th ough teachers often argue that they 
are all underpaid and that across-the-board raises are 
needed, our assessment of the available evidence is that 
there is not a uniform, pervasive mismatch between the 
supply of and demand for teachers.  Instead, shortages 
are more localized in nature and disproportionately 
characterize some schools and some subject areas.49
A number of districts are trying out ways of using 
bonuses and incentives to attract the teachers they 
require and place them in the schools that most need 
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Figure 3—Career tracks in Singapore
Th e Singapore Ministry of Education has created three career tracks for teachers to recognize that they have 
diﬀ erent aspirations.  Individuals who want to remain in the classroom can follow the  teaching track and 
become senior or master teachers.  Th e leadership track leads to positions within schools and the Ministry.  
Th e specialist track is designed for those interested in developing deep knowledge and skills in such areas as 
curriculum and instructional design or educational testing and measurement.  Th ose in the Master Teacher 2 
category can earn a salary equivalent to a school vice-principal.  Individuals can move laterally across the career 
tracks if their interests change and they satisfy the criteria for the new position.
Sources:  Singapore Ministry of Education website, http://www.moe.gov.sg/careers/teach/career-info/ (accessed March 31, 2009); 
Lynn Olson, Teaching Policy to Improve Student Learning: Lessons from Abroad (Washington, D.C.: Aspen Institute, February 2006),
http://www.aspeninstitute.org/sites/default/ﬁ les/content/docs/education%20and%20society%20program/Ed_Lessons_from_Abroad.pdf
(accessed March 10, 2009)
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them.  Two districts in North Carolina illustrate some 
of the possibilities (see Figure 4).
More initiatives are needed, however.  Current eﬀ orts 
are too few, are sometimes poorly targeted, may not 
involve enough extra pay to change teacher behavior, 
and may not be suﬃ  ciently well coordinated with other 
improvements, especially in working conditions, that 
have been shown to matter to teachers.
Th e Incidence of Market-Based Pay
Th e latest national data on the incidence of market-
based pay comes from the federal Schools and Staﬃ  ng 
Survey for school year 2003-04.   At that time only 12 
percent of public school districts reported that they 
used pay incentives to recruit or retain teachers to teach 
in ﬁ elds of shortage (see Figure 5).  Just 5 percent used 
pay incentives to recruit or retain teachers to teach in 
a less desirable location.  Th is was true at the same 
time when a quarter or more of schools were reporting 
that they found it very diﬃ  cult or impossible to ﬁ ll 
vacancies in certain ﬁ elds, including special education, 
mathematics, physical sciences, English as a Second 
Language, foreign languages, and vocational or techni-
cal education.50
Th is disparity suggests that many more districts 
should be using market-based pay to obtain high 
quality teachers in all ﬁ elds and classrooms.   
State as well as district policy makers can sponsor 
market-based incentives.  According to the National 
Council on Teacher Quality, in 2008 22 states had 
diﬀ erential pay programs for teachers in high-needs 
schools, and 20 states oﬀ ered diﬀ erential pay in 
shortage subject areas.51  In California, for example, 
teachers who have won certiﬁ cation from the voluntary 
National Board for Professional Teaching Standards 
(NBPTS) can receive bonuses of $20,000, allocated 
over 4 years, for working in a teacher leadership posi-
tion in a low-performing school.  Under New York 
State’s “Teachers for Tomorrow” program, districts that 
have low-performing schools or that are experiencing 
teacher shortages can apply for state grants for Master 
Teachers and/or Recruitment Incentives.  Master 
Teachers must be NBPTS-certiﬁ ed and must agree to 
serve in a low-performing school for three years.  Th ey 
receive a $10,000 bonus annually.   First-time teachers 
in a district who agree to teach in a shortage area can 
receive $3,400 per year, renewable for three additional 
years.
Targeting Labor Market Incentives
Th e fact that a number of states report that they are 
providing targeted incentives is encouraging, but the 
ﬁ nancial incentives used to recruit and/or retain 
teachers are not always well focused on schools 
and subject areas with shortages.  North Carolina, 
for example, which provides pay supplements of 12 
percent of salary to NBPTS teachers, does not require 
these teachers to undertake any special responsibilities.  
Researchers have found that schools in the state serving 
the most advantaged students have more than twice the 
percentage of board-certiﬁ ed teachers than do schools 
serving the highest-poverty schools.  Th us the state 
salary supplement does nothing to encourage certiﬁ ed 
teachers to work in schools where eﬀ ective instruction 
is most needed.52
Just as across-the-board pay hikes are unlikely to be 
eﬃ  cient and eﬀ ective ways of meeting teacher quality 
objectives, poorly targeted labor market incentives 
will consume public funds without improving the 
instruction students receive.  
Th e Adequacy of Pay Incentives
Many incentives used by districts and states to address 
hiring diﬃ  culties in hard-to-ﬁ ll subjects and in hard-
to-staﬀ  schools may be too low to be eﬀ ective.  Th ere 
are no reliable national data on the level of labor 
market incentives currently being oﬀ ered, but in many 
cases they appear to amount to a few thousand dollars 
at best.
Research suggests that larger incentives may be re-
quired to change teacher behavior and/or to attract 
individuals into teaching who currently choose 
other occupations.  According to one summary of the 
literature,53 low salaries discourage many majors in 
so-called STEM subjects (science, technology, engi-
neering, and math) from considering teaching careers.  
Th e diﬀ erence between the private sector salaries and 
teaching salaries for math and science teachers is much 
greater than it is for teachers in other ﬁ elds.  Gaps 
grow as graduates are employed for longer periods of 
time.  Whereas teachers with similar experience earn 
the same salaries no matter their ﬁ eld of expertise, 
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Figure 4—Incentive pay in two North Carolina districts
North Carolina prepares many fewer teachers in its teacher training institutions than it needs to hire each 
year, so the state must attract teacher candidates from elsewhere.  Furthermore, most of its districts are 
geographically large, with multiple and diverse schools.  Th ese districts must be concerned about how to 
encourage teachers to work where they are most needed, which frequently means attracting them to the most 
educationally challenged environments.
Guilford County (which includes the cities of Greensboro and High Point as well as many rural areas) faced 
challenges in hiring staﬀ  for some schools and subjects.  For example, in 2005-06 one middle school had 
no certiﬁ ed math teachers on its staﬀ .  Th e county launched its “Mission Possible” program as a three-year 
pilot in the fall of 2006.  Mission Possible schools are identiﬁ ed on the basis of student poverty, high teacher 
turnover, and low school performance.  Teachers at these schools can earn both recruitment and retention 
bonuses as well as performance incentives.  Th e former range from $2,500 to $10,000 annually depending on 
the position.  Th e highest recruitment/retention bonuses go to Algebra I teachers and high school principals.  
Performance incentives range from $2,500 to $5,000, depending on the position and how well students 
perform.  Teachers are eligible for either $2,500 or $4,000 bonuses depending on whether their students 
show learning gains at or above the district means.  Principals and curriculum facilitators earn bonuses if the 
school meets its Adequate Yearly Progress goals under the federal No Child Left Behind Act.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Schools (CMS) has consolidated several performance-pay and bonus programs 
into a more comprehensive, performance-based incentive system called Leadership for Educator’s Advanced 
Performance.  LEAP focuses on high-needs schools where student performance is low and teacher and 
principal turnover is high.  Teachers and principals at LEAP schools can earn merit-based salary supple-
ments worth up to 10 percent of salary annually based on reaching student achievement goals.  Th ese goals 
are established by individual teachers, with school and district approval.  Existing assessment instruments 
(including North Carolina’s statewide standardized tests) and teacher-designed tools are used to measure 
student achievement.  To win performance-based awards administrators and teachers are also evaluated using 
speciﬁ ed appraisal instruments.  In addition to performance-based pay, teachers and principals can earn a 
$10,000 signing bonus for accepting positions in hard-to-staﬀ , high-need schools; teachers who agree to 
teach hard-to-staﬀ  subjects can earn an $8,000 signing bonus.  In addition, LEAP teachers and principals 
can earn incentive stipend pay of $115 per day for attending approved professional development activities or 
assuming leadership roles and extra duties related to improving student achievement.
CMS has partnered with the Community Training and Assistance Center (CTAC) in Boston in developing 
LEAP.  CTAC brings expertise and guidance to the design process and conducts independent evaluation and 
assessment services for the project.  CTAC evaluated the Denver performance-pay project that eventually led 
to the district-wide ProComp program.
Sources:  Cortney Rowland, “Mission Possible: A Comprehensive Teacher Incentive Program in Guilford County, North Carolina,” Center for 
Educator Compensation Reform  (April 2008),  http://www.cecr.ed.gov/guides/summaries/GuilfordCountyCaseSummary.pdf; “Community 
Training and Assistance Center and the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Schools Leadership for Educator’s Advanced Performance” program description, 
Center for Educator Compensation Reform, http://www.cecr.ed.gov/initiatives/proﬁ les/pdfs/CommunityTrainingandAssistanceCenter.pdf (both 
accessed April 15, 2009).
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Source: National Center for Education Statistics, Schools and Staﬃ  ng Survey (SASS), 2003-2004 Public School Tables, Table 35, 
http://nces.ed.gov/surveys/sass/tables/state_2004_35.asp (accessed March 31, 2009).   
one researcher found that, in the private sector, 1994 
graduates with technical majors earned about $11,000 
annually more than graduates in other ﬁ elds.  Another 
researcher surveyed undergraduate majors and pre-
majors in science, math, and technology and found that 
entry level teacher salaries would need to be 25 percent 
higher to attract 20 percent of the respondents to 
consider teaching. 
Likewise, researchers who have looked at how large 
pay increases would need to be to overcome teacher 
reluctance to work in hard-to-staﬀ  schools suggest that 
the incentives would have to be sizeable.  Some have 
proposed that the incentives would have to amount 
to 15 to 20 percent of pay; others have indicated that 
to attract teachers to schools with a high proportion 
of students who are academically very disadvantaged 
and either black or Hispanic might require as much as 
50 percent more pay than for teachers in schools with 
predominantly white or Asian, academically well-
prepared students.54
How pay incentives are structured is also likely to 
inﬂ uence their eﬀ ectiveness.  Although some districts 
and states are beginning to oﬀ er sizeable incentives, 
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as much as $10,000 to $15,000 for math and science 
teachers, these incentives are generally made available 
through one-time bonuses rather than regular addi-
tions to salary.  Sometimes the bonuses require the 
teacher to remain in a designated assignment for three 
years.55  Such programs may help alleviate shortages, 
but are unlikely to solve them.
Districts occasionally boost the salaries of teachers in 
shortage ﬁ elds by initially placing them at a higher step 
on the salary schedule than the teacher’s experience 
level would warrant.  Th is is one way of providing a 
permanent boost in pay for selected teachers, although 
it does not amount to an increase as large as the re-
search cited above suggests may be needed.
At this point, the research base is insuﬃ  cient to 
indicate just how large pay increases would need to 
be to attract high quality teachers to hard-to-staﬀ  
schools and in hard-to-ﬁ ll subjects.  Th e answer is 
likely to vary according to the speciﬁ c circumstances of 
diﬀ erent school districts and labor markets.  
We urge districts and states to be bolder in address-
ing diﬀ erential pay and to evaluate carefully the 
Figure 5 – Percentage of public school districts that used pay incentives for 
various reasons, 2003-04
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eﬀ ects of new pay incentives so that over time it will 
be possible to determine what levels of incentives are 
needed to meet staﬃ  ng objectives.  Th e non-educa-
tion sector is a potential source of ideas, since, as one 
report says, “in civil service, the military, the medical 
ﬁ eld, and private industry, paying more for hard-to-
staﬀ  positions, or ‘market-pay,’ is common practice.”  
Th e authors say that organizations outside of educa-
tion are providing much larger incentives than most 
schools and have experience calculating and adjusting 
the amounts needed to address their personnel short-
ages.  In one particularly innovative approach, the Navy 
uses an auction system allowing sailors to bid on jobs 
by indicating the amount of pay they would require to 
accept the position.  Evidence from other sectors also 
suggests that the eﬀ ectiveness of labor market pay is 
enhanced when combined with performance pay.56
An Important Corollary: Improved Working 
Conditions
An important corollary to this discussion about the 
size and eﬀ ectiveness of pay incentives is that teach-
ers respond to both pay and working conditions 
in schools.  Research consistently ﬁ nds that both 
matter to teachers.  Mentoring and induction pro-
grams, class sizes, the amount of autonomy granted 
teachers, and the amount of administrative support 
provided to them aﬀ ects decisions about whether to 
stay in a school or not.57
Estimates of how much extra pay it would take to ame-
liorate teacher shortages generally assume that working 
conditions remain unchanged.  Improving working 
conditions may reduce the pay diﬀ erentials that are 
needed, particularly to attract teachers to hard-to-staﬀ  
schools.  
Conclusions
Denver Pro-Comp demonstrates that it is possible to 
replace the single salary schedule with a new structure 
of teacher pay.  We are not recommending, however, 
that other districts merely copy Pro-Comp, although 
surely there are things to be learned from Denver’s 
experience and from other pay reforms being launched 
around the country.  Districts operate in diﬀ erent labor 
markets, however, and have diﬀ erent needs which 
should be reﬂ ected in local pay plans.  Creative as it 
is, ProComp does not include all the features (such 
as career paths) that a local jurisdiction might want 
to include in a pay structure designed to attract high 
quality teachers.  Perhaps most important, a key lesson 
from both past and current eﬀ orts to implement new 
kinds of compensation is that reforms are unlikely 
to work if they are imposed from the outside rather 
than developed locally and jointly by the various 
stakeholders who will have to support and sustain 
them over time.   We shall see in Chapter 4, however, 
that state and federal policy makers have important 
roles to play in incentivizing and supporting local 
eﬀ orts.
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Discussion of teacher compensation reform usually 
focuses on current pay.  Deferred pay in the form of 
pension beneﬁ ts ought also to be re-assessed given 
the sizeable resources devoted to pension contribu-
tions and growing evidence that pension policies may 
work against other eﬀ orts to improve teacher quality. 
Th ey discourage entry by talented individuals who do 
not view teaching as a lifetime profession and penalize 
teachers who are geographically mobile.
 Teachers mostly participate in statewide retirement 
systems oﬀ ering so-called deﬁ ned beneﬁ t (DB) pen-
sions, which guarantee that in retirement they will 
receive an annual payment based on ﬁ nal average 
salary and years of service.  It is frequently argued that 
deﬁ ned beneﬁ t plans are very important to teachers, 
providing them secure and relatively generous retire-
ment income in return for a lifetime of public service 
at comparatively low pay.*  Th e National Education 
Association, the nation’s largest teacher union, has 
adopted a policy resolution stating that “the retirement 
security of all pre-K through 12 members of retire-
ment systems can be assured only by participation in 
a state or local retirement system with a guaranteed 
and adequate deﬁ ned beneﬁ t retirement plan.”58  Th e 
American Federation of Teachers says:  “Th e traditional 
[deﬁ ned beneﬁ t] public pension system is the best way 
to ensure taxpayers can reliably receive vital services. 
It’s a cost-eﬀ ective, proven and stable method to attract 
and retain qualiﬁ ed people to perform critical public 
sector work.”59
Th is chapter will show, however, that the exist-
ing pension structure does not serve teachers as 
well as its advocates proclaim.  While traditional 
deﬁ ned beneﬁ t plans with their back-loaded beneﬁ ts 
treat long-serving teachers well, they short-change 
individuals who do not work a full career in teaching 
or who move from state to state.   A sizeable number 
of teachers follow career paths that end up penalizing 
them ﬁ nancially at retirement time.  Th e ﬁ nancial 
penalties imposed on mobile and less-than-full-career 
teachers subsidize the beneﬁ ts of long-term teachers 
who stay in one pension plan.  Th ese ﬁ nancial penalties 
are inconsistent with the objective of recruiting more 
highly talented individuals into teaching for substantial 
periods that are still less than a full career.  Employers 
also suﬀ er from policies that discourage people from 
moving to schools where their skills and knowledge 
are most needed, or that encourage people to retire 
early even if they are still valued employees.  
Especially in light of the recent ﬁ nancial market 
turmoil, raising the possibility of rethinking teacher 
pension policies may appear very threatening to the 
retirement security of those who beneﬁ t from existing 
plans.  Th erefore, it is important to stress that we 
are not making an argument that a shift away from 
deﬁ ned beneﬁ t plans would be in the public interest.  
Deﬁ ned beneﬁ t pensions in the private sector have 
largely been replaced by deﬁ ned contribution plans, 
which are more neutral in their treatment of plan par-
ticipants who follow diﬀ erent career patterns.  We do 
not believe, however, that changes in the private sector 
are necessarily a reason for public policies to change, 
because the legal and economic context is substan-
tially diﬀ erent for public and private sector pensions.  
Moreover, there are a number of reforms to deﬁ ned 
beneﬁ t plans, such as portability options and cash 
balance plans, that could reduce or eliminate many 
of the problematic consequences while still providing 
teachers with the advantages of participating in a 
deﬁ ned beneﬁ t plan.  Th ere are also opportunities 
for combining deﬁ ned beneﬁ t and deﬁ ned contribu-
tion plans, as a few states already do.  Discussions of 
CHAPTER 3:  Pensions
* We do not necessarily endorse the view that teaching is a relatively underpaid profession.  Th e issue is a complicated one and is much contested among 
researchers.  We simply point out here that teacher advocates do believe that an important justiﬁ cation for current deﬁ ned beneﬁ t plans is that they “make 
up” in some sense for lower wages.
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pension reform should not, as often happens, deﬁ ne 
the debate as “deﬁ ned beneﬁ t versus deﬁ ned contribu-
tion” but instead should focus on how to align teacher 
pension policies with other policies for attracting the 
best teachers possible to the nation’s public schools.*
Overview of Teacher Pensions
Although teacher salaries are determined to a large 
extent by local school boards, teacher pensions are 
primarily provided through state-wide pension plans 
operating under policies set by state legislators.  Th e 
exception is a handful of big-city school districts that 
continue to operate stand-alone teacher pension plans.  
Reliance on state-wide plans means that teacher pen-
sions are the product of political negotiations at the 
state level, unlike salaries which are often collectively 
bargained by teacher unions and local school author-
ities.  Although pension beneﬁ ts are not collectively 
bargained, public employees are much more likely to 
be represented by labor unions than are private sector 
workers;60 and organized labor plays a prominent role 
in debates over government retirement beneﬁ ts.   In the 
state-wide teacher pension plans, pension policies are 
generally uniform for all the participants in the state, 
even though local districts may diﬀ er substantially 
in their ability to attract and keep enough eﬀ ective 
instructors to staﬀ  all their schools and subjects.
In ﬁ scal year 2005-06 state and local governments 
provided pension beneﬁ ts through 221 state plans and 
2,433 local ones, but most of these plans serve state 
and local employees other than teachers.  Teachers par-
ticipate in only about 60 of these plans.  In this report 
when we refer to teacher pension plans, we are referring 
to 59 plans that cover teachers and that are included 
in the Public Fund Survey, a continuously updated 
online compendium of data on 101 public retirement 
systems that operate 125 plans covering more than 85 
percent of the state and local public retirement system 
community.61
As of 2008, teachers in every state but Alaska had as 
their primary pension arrangement a deﬁ ned beneﬁ t 
(DB) plan† (see Figure 6).  DB plans were historically 
the type of pension coverage oﬀ ered by both private 
and public sector employers who oﬀ ered retirement 
beneﬁ ts.
Unlike private employers, public employers such as 
school districts generally expect teachers to contribute 
directly from their salaries to their retirement plans.  
DB plans for teachers who also have Social Security 
coverage,‡ and who thus pay Social Security tax of 6.2 
percent of earnings, require on average an additional 
employee contribution of 4.5 percent.  Pension plans 
for non-Social Security participants require on average 
a nearly 8 percent employee contribution. In some 
plans these ﬁ gures rise as high as 9.5 percent and 12.5 
percent, respectively. 62  
Employers also contribute to pension plans on behalf 
of their employees, at an average of 9 percent of salaries 
in plans for Social Security participants and 11.1 
percent for non-participants.  Again, in individual plans 
these contributions may rise as high as 25 percent 
and 21 percent, respectively.63  For teachers covered by 
Social Security, these contributions are on top of the 
6.2 percent of taxable earnings employers are required 
to pay into the federal retirement system.
Employer pension contributions are thus substantial. 
Furthermore, they are growing relative to the retire-
ment contributions made on behalf of private-sector 
professionals by employers.  Drawing on an employer 
* See Memorandum, p. 56.
† Many teachers have the option of making voluntary contributions (without any employer assistance) to a separate DC plan for supplemental savings.  
Th ese supplemental plans, like DB plans, are tax advantaged under the Internal Revenue Code (so that individuals do not incur a tax liability until they 
begin drawing retirement beneﬁ ts), but we do not consider them in this report.
‡ Teachers in 13 states for the most part do not participate in Social Security:  Alaska, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana, 
Massachusetts, Maine, Missouri, Nevada, Ohio, and Texas.  Public employees were originally excluded from Social Security because of constitutional 
questions about whether the federal government could impose taxes on states and local governments.  In the 1950s state and local government were given 
the option of enrolling some or all of their workers.  In nonparticipating states, some school districts have chosen to participate in the program.  Since 
1986 almost all state and local government workers are required to participate in Medicare.
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Figure 6—Pension plan types
Deﬁ ned beneﬁ t (DB) pensions, which dominate in public sector retirement systems, guarantee employees a 
speciﬁ ed annual retirement beneﬁ t based on one of several kinds of formulas.  Public sector jobs typically use a 
formula that bases beneﬁ ts on average earnings during a speciﬁ ed number of years at the end of a participant’s 
career.  A teacher typically receives an initial annual pension payment that is determined by multiplying (1) 
years of service by (2) some measure of ﬁ nal salary (often a three-year ﬁ nal average) by (3) a multiplier or 
beneﬁ t factor (“M”).  Th us: 
Annual income in ﬁ rst year of retirement = service (years) X ﬁ nal annual salary X M. 
For example, if a teacher retired with 30 years of service and a ﬁ nal average salary of $60,000 and his or her 
pension plan used an “M” of 2 percent, annual income in the ﬁ rst year of retirement would be $36,000.   “M” 
may be a constant for every year of service or it may be higher for years of service above some threshold (such 
as 25 or 30 years).
Teachers’ DB plans have several features that are common in public sector pensions but that are increasingly 
rare in the private sector.  Th ese include (1) cost-of-living adjustments (COLAs), which may be ﬁ xed or 
variable; (2) young ages for normal retirement with full beneﬁ ts, often in their 50s for long-serving teachers; (3) 
early retirement beneﬁ ts; and (4) retiree health beneﬁ ts.   Th e availability and form of the latter vary from state 
to state.
Deﬁ ned contribution (DC) pensions require employers to contribute speciﬁ ed amounts (often a percentage 
of salary) to individual accounts established for participating employees.  Th e beneﬁ t available to the employee 
at retirement depends on the amount contributed by the employer, any contribution by the employee, and the 
investment income earned on these contributions over the years. Usually the employee manages the invest-
ments in his or her individual account. Th e employer does not guarantee the employee any speciﬁ c level of 
income in retirement.
Cash balance (CB) pensions are legally regulated as deﬁ ned beneﬁ t plans, but they deﬁ ne beneﬁ ts in ways that 
resemble deﬁ ned-contribution plans.  Each participant has a stated account balance.  Participants’ accounts 
are credited each year with an employer contribution and with an interest credit tied to an index such as the 
one-year Treasury bill rate.  Plan beneﬁ ts are determined by the balance that has been credited to the employee 
over the years.  Cash balance plans usually oﬀ er payouts for retirees as either annuities or lump-sum payments.  
Th ose leaving the plan before retirement can roll their balances over into Individual Retirement Accounts or 
into the retirement plan of another employer, if the latter accepts rollovers. 
survey conducted by the U.S. Department of Labor, 
Robert Costrell and Michael Podgursky calculate that 
the gap between employer retirement contributions 
for teachers and for private-sector professionals more 
than doubled, from 1.9 to 4.2 percent of earnings, over 
the 2004-2008 period for which data are available.  
Private employer contributions for professionals stayed 
at roughly the same percentage of earnings over that 
period, while employer contributions for teachers rose 
substantially.64 
DB plans are increasingly rare in the private sector.  
In the 1980s and 1990s, private employers shifted 
strongly to deﬁ ned contribution (DC) plans.   In 2007, 
only 21 percent of private industry workers had access 
to a deﬁ ned beneﬁ t plan, while 83 percent of state and 
local workers had access to such a plan.   Conversely, 
55 percent of private industry workers had access to 
a deﬁ ned contribution plan, while only 29 percent of 
state and local workers did.65  Furthermore, a quarter 
of private sector deﬁ ned beneﬁ t plans were no longer 
of the traditional type; most of these were cash balance 
instead of average-salary type plans.66
While the traditional DB design continues to char-
acterize almost all teacher pension plans, there are a 
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few exceptions.  Several states have adopted “hybrid” 
plans as their primary plans for teachers.  In Indiana, 
Oregon, and Washington State, some teachers (e.g., 
new hires after a speciﬁ ed date) participate in plans 
that have both a traditional ﬁ nal-average-salary DB and 
a DC component.  Members of Washington’s Teachers 
Plan 3, for example, are teachers who joined the plan 
after July 1, 1996 or who chose to transfer from an 
older plan. Employer contributions on teachers’ behalf 
are made to the DB plan.  Employees’ own contribu-
tions are invested in individual DC plan accounts.67 
Th e “M” in the DB beneﬁ t formulas in these hybrid 
plans is lower than the “M” found in typical teacher 
DB programs, because part of a teacher’s retirement 
income is expected to come from his/her individual 
DC account.
In Florida, Ohio, and South Carolina, teachers have 
the option of choosing a DC plan as their primary plan 
rather than participating in the DB plan.68 Th is option 
is thought to be especially attractive to teachers who do 
not expect to spend a full career in teaching or in the 
same state or district, for reasons that will be discussed 
more extensively later.
DB plans typically pay out retiree beneﬁ ts as a lifetime 
income stream that, as noted above, is frequently 
adjusted in some fashion to reﬂ ect cost-of-living 
increases during the retiree’s post-employment years.  
For teachers in the thirteen states that do not partici-
pate in Social Security, this form of beneﬁ t is especially 
important.  Social Security recipients have a guaran-
teed, inﬂ ation-adjusted retirement income to undergird 
whatever other pension and retirement savings they 
have. Th ey are also eligible for Social Security death 
and disability beneﬁ ts.  In nonparticipating states, 
employees’ state or local retirement plans must meet 
retirement needs that elsewhere are met jointly by 
Social Security and employer-sponsored pension plans. 
Teachers without Social Security coverage must also 
look to their employer-sponsored plan for disability 
and survivors’ insurance if employees are to have access 
to such beneﬁ ts.  
State and local pension plans are exempt from most 
of the provisions of the federal Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act (ERISA) which governs private 
sector pensions, although subnational governments 
must abide by certain Internal Revenue Code require-
ments to protect pension plan members from incurring 
tax liabilities on their pension contributions and on 
their accumulating pension beneﬁ ts before retirement.  
In general, however, regulation of state and local 
pension plans occurs through numerous state rules that 
are embedded in state constitutions, laws, and regula-
tions.  Th ese are regarded as generally oﬀ ering public 
employees even stronger protections than those enjoyed 
by private workers. 
Effects on Retirement Age, Mobility, 
and Short-Term Teachers
Traditional DB pension plans, with their back-loaded 
beneﬁ ts based on ﬁ nal average salaries, treat long-serv-
ing employees well but impose penalties on individuals 
who teach in various jurisdictions or spend less than a 
full career in the classroom.  Th is fact has been gener-
ally understood by labor economists and others for a 
long time.  Little evidence has been available, however, 
on how the size and allocation of pension beneﬁ ts are 
aﬀ ected by various features of teacher pension plans 
(e.g., the use of years of service than or in addition to 
age in beneﬁ t formulas; the availability of early retire-
ment beneﬁ ts) and on how much of a penalty teachers 
incur for job mobility or short careers.
New research by Costrell and Podgursky69 is now 
ﬁ lling in these blanks.  Th eir ﬁ ndings, based on analysis 
of comprehensive administrative data on teachers from 
several states, are very disturbing from a human capital 
perspective.  Th e ﬁ ndings illustrate how plan features 
unrelated to school staﬃ  ng needs create incentives 
for longer-serving teachers to hang onto their jobs 
until peak pension beneﬁ ts are earned and then 
to retire, often at young ages compared to private-
sector employees.  Th eir data show that actual teacher 
behavior is consistent with these incentives.  Costrell 
and Podgursky also provide results that quantify the 
pension penalties for job mobility and that show how 
current pension policies shift pension wealth from 
shorter -to- longer-term teachers. 
Pension Wealth Accumulation
Key to identifying inequities and ineﬃ  ciencies in 
current pension policies is calculating how pension 
beneﬁ ts are aﬀ ected by teacher choices and program 
details.  Costrell and Podgursky begin this process 
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by determining the pension wealth that a teacher has 
earned at each year in her career.  Pension wealth is a 
measure of the present value of a stream of pension 
payments or the market value of an equivalent annuity.  
Participants in traditional ﬁ nal-average-salary deﬁ ned 
beneﬁ t pension plans do not accrue pension wealth 
evenly over their careers.  Costrell and Podgursky show 
this in Figure 7 for an illustrative teacher in the Ohio 
retirement system.  In the example of the Ohio teacher, 
pension wealth accumulates very slowly for 20 or so 
years and then rises rapidly.  Although the exact shape 
of the wealth curve reﬂ ects speciﬁ c features of the Ohio 
plan, the overall shape is characteristic of traditional 
DB plans.  Th e curve measuring accrued pension 
wealth takes a “spiky” shape because of normal and 
early retirement provisions.  Th ese create incentives 
that encourage teachers to hang on to their jobs until 
a pension peak is reached and then to retire soon, 
whether or not their schools still need them.  In ad-
dition, accrued pension wealth can be used to calculate 
how much it costs teachers to move from one teaching 
job and pension plan to another, even if they work a full 
career in the profession.
Another way to look at pension wealth is to compare 
its annual growth to annual salary.  Even though in the 
Ohio example total pension wealth rises throughout 
most of a long career, the annual increase in pension 
wealth net of the earnings on the previous year’s wealth 
(“deferred compensation”) changes in idiosyncratic 
ways compared to annual salary (“current compensa-
tion”) late in a teacher’s career.  Costrell and Podgursky 
also show this phenomenon for the illustrative Ohio 
teacher in Figure 8.  Th e “peaks and cliﬀ s” portrayed in 
this ﬁ gure occur because of the way early and normal 
retirement provisions operate.  When a teacher reaches 
Figure 7—Pension wealth in dollars
Source:  Robert Costrell and Michael Podgursky, Golden Peaks and Perilous Cliﬀ s: Rethinking Ohio’s Teacher Pension System (Washington, DC:  
Th omas B. Fordham Institute, June 2007).
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* Arkansas, California, Massachusetts, Missouri, and Texas.
the year in which she become eligible for these beneﬁ ts, 
there is a sharp increase in the present value of her 
pension because, if she retires then, she will receive 
retirement beneﬁ ts for a longer period.  If she continues 
to work, however, some of that extra beneﬁ t is lost; she 
will spend fewer years receiving pension income until 
she reaches another spike in the deferred compensation 
curve because of reaching another beneﬁ t threshold.  
Again, this particular pattern in Figure 8 describes 
Ohio’s pensions, but Costrell and Podgursky have 
found similar peaks and cliﬀ s in ﬁ ve other teacher 
pension plans they have studied.70*  As discussed below, 
these peaks and cliﬀ s create retirement incentives and 
disincentives for individual teachers that are discon-
nected from their employers’ interests in staﬃ  ng 
schools or retaining particularly eﬀ ective teachers.
A third way of looking at pension wealth is to compare 
the present value of accumulated pension beneﬁ ts 
when a teacher separates from service with the present 
value of all the income she had earned by the time 
she separates.  Th is ratio is a cumulative, rather than 
annual, measure of deferred compensation.  Costrell 
and Podgursky have developed these measures for six 
teacher pension plans and use them to calculate the 
amounts of pension wealth redistributed  from shorter-
term to longer-term teachers.
Pension Wealth and Teacher Mobility
In general the structure of the traditional DB plans 
serves teachers well if they work a full career in teach-
ing.  Th ose who do not, however, pay a high price in 
terms of pension wealth.  
Figure 8—annual deferred income, as percentage of earnings
Source:  Robert Costrell and Michael Podgursky, Golden Peaks and Perilous Cliﬀ s: Rethinking Ohio’s Teacher Pension System (Washington, DC:  
Th omas B. Fordham Institute, June 2007).
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Table 5 – Pension losses from mobility
(25-year-old entrants, 15 years in fi rst job)
State
Age 55 "separators" 
loss of pension 
wealth as percent 
of stayers’ wealth
Missouri 65%
Arkansas 54%
Ohio 74%
California 41%
Texas (new hires) 73%
Massachusetts 58%
Source: Robert Costrell and Michael Podgursky, “Distribution of 
Beneﬁ ts in Teacher Retirement Systems and Th eir Implications for 
Mobility,” Conference Paper 2009-04 (Nashville, TN:  National Center 
on Performance Incentives, Vanderbilt University, 2009).
A teacher who leaves his or her job short of a full career 
generally can (and sometimes must) remain in a DB 
plan as an “inactive” member and receive a pension later 
at retirement age.  Th e pension formula used to calcu-
late the retirement beneﬁ t, however, will reﬂ ect the ﬁ nal 
average salary at the time the teacher left the system.  
Since this could have been many years earlier, inﬂ ation 
will have taken a severe toll on the beneﬁ t level.
Costrell and Podgursky demonstrate (see Table 5) 
using actual data for six states that “mobility losses” 
for teachers who work for 30 years in 2 jobs of 15 
years each are large:  ranging from 41 percent to 74 
percent (depending on the state where the teacher 
had her ﬁ rst job) of the pension wealth of a 30-year 
teacher who has just one job.  Th ey use conservative 
parameters in their model;* the actual mobility loss 
would likely be higher. 
Some plans allow a departing teacher to cash-out the 
retirement beneﬁ t in some way.  Seldom, however, 
will this teacher receive full credit for his or her own 
contributions, the employer contribution, and a market 
rate of return on these investments.  Generally, a 
teacher withdrawing from a pension plan will lose all of 
the employer contributions made on his or her behalf.  
A few states have modiﬁ ed their plans to be more 
generous to departing employees.  In South Dakota, for 
example, teachers leaving after three years of credited 
service but before retirement can select a “portable 
retirement option” which allows them to take with 
them their accumulated contributions, including both 
employee and employer shares, and credited interest.  
Departing teachers also have the option of remaining 
members of the state pension plan; in this case their 
ﬁ nal average salaries are indexed to account for inﬂ ation 
in the years between their departure and their eligibility 
to receive an annuity.  Th e Colorado Public Employees 
Retirement Association allows a departing teacher who 
leaves before retirement or age 65 to receive his or her 
* Costrell and Podgursky calculate mobility losses by modeling what happens to an illustrative teacher who, after 15 years on the job in one state, takes a 
new job in another state.  To estimate the “pure” mobility loss, they assume that the pension plan covering the second job uses the same pension formula 
as the old job.  Th ey also assume that the salary schedule in the new job is the same as the salary schedule in the old job and that the teacher is given credit 
on the schedule in the new job for all of her years of service (i.e., 15) in the old job.  Th is latter assumption is highly unlikely to hold in practice.  Many 
districts have limits on the number of years of service they will recognize for pay purposes when a teacher transfers in.  In the model, the mobile teacher, 
after 30 years of service, is eligible for two pensions, one from the old job and one from the new.  Compared to a “stayer” who remains in one pension 
system for all 30 years, the mobile teacher planning to retire after a 30-year career will be penalized because her ﬁ nal-average-salary determination from 
the ﬁ rst job is based on the salary when she left the system 15 years earlier, with no accounting for subsequent inﬂ ation.  She also will have fewer years of 
retirement income than the “stayer.”  Th e latter is assumed to retire at age 55 and to be eligible to draw a full pension immediately.  Th e mobile teacher, 
with only 15 years in each system, should defer her pension draw until age 60 to avoid costly early-retirement penalties.
own accumulated contributions (including interest at 
a 5 percent rate) plus a 50 percent “match” that gives 
the employee at least partial credit for the employer’s 
contribution.  
Long vesting periods can further penalize a mobile 
teacher who may leave before becoming vested (i.e., en-
titled to receive beneﬁ ts) in her pension plan.  Vesting 
periods in teacher pension plans are long compared 
to those in the private sector, as Table 6 illustrates.  
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ERISA sets a maximum vesting period of six years for 
private sector employers.  In nine states, teachers have 
to work for 10 years before becoming vested in the 
pension plan.
“Purchase of service credit” provisions exist in virtually 
all teacher pension plans and in theory compensate 
for some of disadvantages facing mobile teachers.  Th e 
provisions are cumbersome and limited, however, and 
diﬀ er from plan to plan.  A mobile teacher who cashes 
out of one plan without receiving full credit for all 
employer and employee contributions and interest will 
probably not have enough money to pay the price of 
purchasing credit in the new system.  An individual 
who enters teaching in mid-career and whose prior 
service was not in teaching or public employment may 
not be allowed to purchase credits.  Th is person may 
be doubly disadvantaged, because he or she may not 
be given much if any credit on the “salary scale” for 
work in another ﬁ eld, so the ﬁ nal pension beneﬁ t will 
reﬂ ect both a limited number of years of service and a 
lower salary than a long-term teacher of the same age 
would have.  For all new entrants to a pension plan, 
the number of years of prior service credits that can be 
purchased is likely to be restricted.
Table 6 – Vesting requirements
No. of years to vest No. of plans
None 4
1-4 9
5 35
6-9 2
10 9
Source: Public Fund Survey, 2009, http://www.publicfundsurvey.org  
(accessed April 15, 2009).
To date there is limited data on the proportion of 
teachers who may suﬀ er ﬁ nancial penalties from 
moving across state lines (or from having shorter 
working lives because they “stop out” for a while for 
family or other personal reasons).  A cursory look 
at ﬁ nancial reports from several state pension plans 
suggests, however, that a signiﬁ cant minority of their 
current retirees left the workforce with fewer than 
the 20 to 25 years of service that would qualify them 
for the good beneﬁ ts that a back-loaded DB system 
provides a long-serving individual.   Th ere is also no 
way to measure the extent to which teachers are locked 
into their current jobs because of the ﬁ nancial price 
they would pay if they left their current pension plan. 
Th e Redistribution of Pension Wealth from Short-
Termers to Career Teachers
Pension contribution rates for teachers and their 
employers do not vary depending on years of service; 
each year the same percentage of a teacher’s earnings is 
directed to the pension plan.  In order to avoid penal-
izing individuals who want to teach for something 
less than a full career, the aggregate pension wealth 
accumulated from these contributions and the earn-
ings on them should not involve a redistribution of 
wealth from short-termers to long-termers.  Yet this 
kind of distribution in fact takes place. 
Costrell and Podgursky have modeled the magnitude 
of the redistribution by comparing pension wealth for 
teachers who enter the profession at age 25 but leave at 
various ages with the pension wealth they would have 
accumulated under a ﬁ scally neutral pension plan such 
as a cash balance plan.71  Th ey calculate “gainers” and 
“losers” based on whether teachers who leave at various 
ages are better or worse oﬀ  than they would have been 
if the same contributions had been directed to a ﬁ scally 
neutral plan.  For the six states for which they have 
teacher records, they determine that 20 to 35 percent 
of teachers, who on average separate in their 50s, are 
gainers, while 65 to 80 percent of teachers, who on 
average separate in their 30s, are losers (See Table 7).
Another way to view the inequity in ﬁ nal-average salary 
DB plans for teachers is to examine the cumulative 
pension wealth (net of their own contributions) a 
teacher has accrued based on when she leaves teaching 
compared to cumulative earnings accrued at the same 
point.  As noted earlier, this is a cumulative measure 
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of deferred compensation.  Costrell and Podgursky 
show, using the Missouri pension system as an example, 
that teachers who enter at age 25 and separate at age 
53 receive deferred compensation from their employer 
of 35.3 percent.  A teacher who leaves at age 30, by 
contrast, receives no deferred compensation from her 
employer at all and in fact earns deferred compensa-
tion that is less than the percentage of income (12.5 
percent) he or she had to contribute each year to the 
pension plan.72
More research is needed on the patterns of pension 
wealth accumulation of teachers who enter at later ages 
(such as second-career teachers) and on those who 
step out of the profession for a while, perhaps to raise 
children.  Given the desirability of making teaching 
attractive to as many talented individuals as possible, 
any ﬁ nancial penalties suﬀ ered by people who follow 
these less-than-full-career teaching paths work 
against the national interest in providing high-
quality instruction for all students.
Rethinking Pension Policy and 
Practice
Concerns over the ﬁ scal condition of pension plans 
are receiving more public attention at present than are 
worries about how pension policies may distort the 
teacher labor market.  Th e fact that current economic 
conditions and big investment losses are putting pen-
sions in the political spotlight may, however, oﬀ er an 
opportunity to consider reducing these distortions as 
various pension issues are debated.
Unfortunately, in our view, the debate over possible 
public pension changes has frequently taken the form 
of an argument over whether deﬁ ned beneﬁ t pensions 
should be replaced, as they largely have been in the 
Table 7 – Redistribution of pension wealth
(Compared to a fi scally neutral plan for teachers entering at age 25)
Gainers Losers
State Share of entrants
Average age 
at separation
Share of entrants
Average age 
at separation
Missouri 35% 54.2 65% 36.6
Arkansas 34% 53.9 66% 37.1
Ohio 33% 56.4 67% 37.8
California 29% 57.8 71% 35.4
Texas (new hires) 35% 57.3 65% 34.8
Massachusetts 20% 57.1 80% 40.2
Source: Robert Costrell and Michael Podgursky, “Distribution of Beneﬁ ts in Teacher Retirement Systems and Th eir Implications for Mobility,” 
Conference Paper 2009-04 (Nashville, TN:  National Center on Performance Incentives, Vanderbilt University, 2009).
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private sector, by deﬁ ned contribution plans.  Deﬁ ning 
the options as “DB vs. DC” oversimpliﬁ es the issue.  
Th ere are a number of reforms to DB plans that 
could reduce or eliminate some of their problematic 
features while still providing teachers with the 
advantages of participating in a deﬁ ned beneﬁ t plan.  
Th ese include hybrid plans, portability options, and 
cash balance plans, which are a type of deﬁ ned beneﬁ t 
plan with a number of DC-like features.
States diﬀ er signiﬁ cantly in terms of the ﬁ scal 
health of their current pension plans and in the legal 
framework that deﬁ nes what pension changes are 
permissible.  Th us speciﬁ c pension reforms need to 
be considered in the context of the ﬁ scal and legal 
environment of each state.
Redesigning Pensions
Th inking of pension redesign in “DB vs. DC” obscures 
several important points.  First is that each type of plan 
has advantages and disadvantages for employers and 
employees.  Second is that the two types of plans are 
not as distinctive as they may at ﬁ rst appear.  Many fea-
tures that might justify a switch to a DC plan can also 
be built into a DB plan, and some DB-type features can 
also be added to DC plans.  Finally, arguing in terms 
of the classic designs of traditional DB and DC 
plans fails to bring into the discussion new types of 
plans, such as the cash balance (CB) deﬁ ned beneﬁ t 
plan.  CB deﬁ ned beneﬁ t plans can be designed 
with features that might address key interests of 
partisans on both sides of the DB/DC divide.  Th e 
CB deﬁ ned beneﬁ t alternative, which has been adopted 
by a number of private sector employers, has been used 
infrequently in the public sector.  It is thus relatively 
unfamiliar to participants in public sector pension 
debates.  
In our opinion, teacher pension plans need to be 
modiﬁ ed to better balance the beneﬁ ts to both em-
ployees and employers.  We think that a wholesale 
switch to DC plans, which would be hard-fought 
by teacher groups and would for legal reasons in 
some states only be possible for future employees, 
is unnecessary.  Modifying the terms of traditional 
deﬁ ned beneﬁ t pensions to better serve short-term 
and mobile workers is one option.  Creating cash 
balance plans for new workers, plus current workers 
who might wish to participate, is another.  In all 
cases, there needs to be wide and ongoing discussion of 
the deferred compensation being promised to teachers 
through the pension system, the ﬁ nancial sustainability 
of those promises, and the desired balance between the 
salaries paid to teachers for their current eﬀ orts and the 
pensions provided for them in retirement. 
Traditional ﬁ nal-average-salary DB plans can be 
redesigned to have some DC-type features.  Th e 
Wisconsin Retirement System allows DB plan partici-
pants to put 50 percent of their and their employer’s 
contributions into a Variable Trust Fund, giving them 
some control over investments but subjecting them to 
some investment risk.  In some DB plans, beneﬁ ciaries 
are now oﬀ ered the opportunity at retirement to take 
a lump-sum distribution rather than being required 
to take a life-time annuity.  Teachers in Colorado’s 
state pension plan, for example, are credited with a 
ﬁ xed interest rate, currently 5 percent compounded 
annually, on their own  contributions.  If an individual 
chooses to withdraw his or her account after retirement 
eligibility or age 65 rather than take an annuity, he or 
she receives the amount credited to the account along 
with a 100 percent match.  Th is eﬀ ectively accounts for 
the employer’s contribution as well.  We have already 
described South Dakota’s Portable Retirement Option 
that removes barriers to mobility for the state’s teach-
ers.
States could also consider establishing an alternative 
form of deﬁ ned beneﬁ t plan, the cash balance (CB) 
plan, which has seldom been adopted for public plans.  
Cash balance plans are legally treated as deﬁ ned beneﬁ t 
programs.  Th ey have certain characteristics in common 
with DB programs,  including guarantees about retire-
ment income beneﬁ ts; but they also have characteristics 
of DC programs.  CB plans share many of the risks in 
pension plans between employers and employees.  DB 
and DC plans, by contrast, place various kinds of risks 
exclusively on one or the other party.
Private employers who continue to sponsor deﬁ ned 
beneﬁ t pensions have moved nearly a quarter of their 
workers into cash balance plans.73  In the public sector, 
however, we could ﬁ nd only two such plans.  California 
has a cash balance plan, administered by the California 
State Teachers Retirement system, for part-time 
teachers.  Nebraska has implemented a CB plan for 
its state and local employees, though not for teachers.  
Nebraska’s state and local employees were in a DC 
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plan from 1964 to 2003.  Investment returns in the 
DC lagged those in the state’s other DB programs over 
that period.  About half of the DC participants were in 
the default investment fund, a low-risk but compara-
tively low-yield stable value fund.  Partially because 
of this, DC participants were receiving signiﬁ cantly 
less replacement income in retirement than had been 
projected.  Nebraska made a new cash balance plan the 
primary pension plan for state and local employees (but 
not for teachers, who remain in a separate DB plan) 
hired on or after January 1, 2003.74
One reason for the slow spread of cash balance plans 
into the public sector may be that, after an initial burst 
of interest in them in the private sector, legal questions 
arose that eﬀ ectively stopped their implementation for 
a number of years.  Th ese issues appear to be largely 
resolved now.  Furthermore, some early features that 
were unpopular with employees were made illegal in 
the Pension Protection Act of 2006.  Implementation 
of CB plans by a number of private employers has 
shown that these plans can be structured in ways that 
beneﬁ t younger workers while not harming older 
workers who expect back-end-loaded beneﬁ ts based on 
their long service.
CB plans do not penalize worker mobility yet do not 
force workers to take on the investment risk associated 
with managing their own investment accounts.  CB 
plans do not remove all investment risk from employ-
ers, especially for plans that guarantee a ﬁ xed interest 
credit; but the risks are much less than with traditional 
DB plans.  Costs become more predictable because the 
percentage of salary the employer is required to con-
tribute is known and the rate of return the employer 
must credit to the employees’ hypothetical accounts is 
tied to market rates.  With CB plans, employers do not 
have to worry that employees will unwisely choose not 
to participate.  Th ey also ﬁ nd that employees under-
stand CB plans better than they understand traditional 
DB plans and therefore give the employer more credit 
for providing the retirement beneﬁ t.75  Employers, 
increasingly concerned about how to attract and/or 
retain older workers, also tend to appreciate the fact 
that CB plans do not penalize older employees who 
work beyond normal retirement age and do not create 
incentives for early retirement.76  
Fiscal Considerations
Fiscal considerations must play a role in discussions 
of pension redesign because treating mobile and 
short-term teachers more equitably will have at least 
short-term costs unless oﬀ set by some decrease in the 
generous beneﬁ ts that teacher pension plans typically 
promise long-term participants.  Th ese include eligibil-
ity for normal retirement with full beneﬁ ts at young 
ages (often in the 50s) and other early retirement 
beneﬁ ts, annual cost of living adjustments for retirees 
who have begun drawing their annuities, and retiree 
health beneﬁ ts.
Th e capacity of a pension plan to treat mobile and 
short-term teachers more favorably without trading 
oﬀ  some of the beneﬁ ts promised to long-termers 
depends in part on the plan’s current funding situ-
ation.  Some are in good shape; others were under-
funded even before the ongoing ﬁ nancial crisis.  
When a plan’s assets match its liabilities, the plan is 
said to be fully funded.  If the ratio of assets to liabili-
ties is less than 100 percent, the plan is described as 
under-funded.  
Funding ratios in teacher pension plans vary widely.  
Table 8 summarizes the ratios found across the plans 
based on the latest available ﬁ nancial reports.*  Th is 
point-in-time snapshot for our 59 teacher plans 
indicates that 26 fell below the 80 percent threshold 
that, according to the U.S. Government Accountability 
Oﬃ  ce, is often used to determine whether a pension 
* Th ese actuarial funding ratios are useful indicators, but they must be interpreted with caution.  Th ey are statements at a particular time 
about how the assets in a pension plan compare to the present value of the beneﬁ ts that plan members have accrued.  Ratios do not 
indicate anything about whether a plan is moving in a healthy or unhealthy direction.  If a plan is amortizing previous unfunded liabilities, 
for example, it may appear at a given point to have a large unfunded liability; but in fact its funding ratio might be on target with a planned 
schedule for achieving ﬁ nancial soundness. Since unfunded liabilities are typically amortized over 30 years, the key question for an under-
funded plan is whether it is making progress in reducing its unfunded liabilities.  Moreover, funding ratios are not strictly comparable from 
plan to plan.  How a speciﬁ c ratio is calculated depends on a variety of approaches used by actuaries to determine such things as the cost 
method, future investment returns, and the asset valuation method.  
46
system is healthy or not.77  Th e data, it should be noted, 
were reported before the ﬁ nancial market turmoil that 
began in late 2007.
Calculations about a plan’s ﬁ nancial strength can be 
quite sensitive to the assumptions made about the 
future rate of return on invested pension funds.  Th is 
becomes increasingly true as a plan matures.*  Some 
observers believe that assumptions about future 
investment returns underlying currently reported 
pension liabilities are unduly rosy.  Investment 
assumptions have increased over time, in part because 
pension plans have increasingly included equities in 
their investment pools.  Figure 9 indicates that the 
modal investment return assumption for teacher retire-
ment plans is 8 percent.  
If these rates of return are not achieved going 
forward, then contribution rates from employers 
and/or employees will have to increase or unfunded 
liabilities reported by pension plans will rise.  Th e 
level of reported liabilities could also be aﬀ ected by 
the outcome of a debate in the pension community 
about how ﬁ nancial liabilities are calculated.  Financial 
economists argue that current liabilities are understated 
because actuaries use a “discount rate” to calculate the 
present value of future beneﬁ ts that is too high.  Th e 
Government Accounting Standards Board, which 
recommends accounting standards for public pensions, 
has recently established a project to study the possibil-
ity of adopting new accounting and ﬁ nancial reporting 
standards for pensions and other postretirement 
beneﬁ ts.78  
Legal Considerations
In addition to considering the ﬁ scal strength of each 
state’s pension plan, pension reformers will also need 
to take into account the legal protection oﬀ ered to 
state and local government plans.  Th is protection is 
so strong that it is sometimes claimed that, “[w]hile 
pension beneﬁ ts can be restructured for future employ-
ees, it is virtually impossible to reduce them for existing 
workers.”79
Th is commonly held view probably overstates the 
case, but it does reﬂ ect the fact that revising pension 
plans can be diﬃ  cult.  Most states have, through 
state constitutions or statute or case law, deﬁ ned 
pension plans as contracts between the state and 
plan participants.  “Where there is state constitutional 
protection speciﬁ c to state pension plans, the courts 
must interpret what protection is granted by the state 
constitution and apply it. In states where a contract is 
created or implied by statute or common law, courts 
must analyze any proposed changes under the federal 
constitution’s contract clause.”80  Th e latter provides 
that “no State shall…pass any…Law impairing the 
Obligation of Contracts.”  
Th e combination of state and federal protections for 
contracts has resulted in various legal interpretations 
around the country about when a contract is deemed to 
be created and what the contract is deemed to protect.  
In the most limiting case, the pension contract has been 
deemed to become eﬀ ective on the date a teacher is 
hired or enters into the pension system, and the ben-
eﬁ ts promised by the pension plan on that date cannot 
Table 8—Actuarial funding ratios for 
teacher pension plans
Funding Number of plans
Plan funded at 100% or more 9
Plan funded at 90% – 99.9% 8
Plan funded at 80% to 89.9% 16
Plan funded at 70% to 79.9% 14
Plan funded at 60% - 69.9% 8
Plan funded below 60% 4
Source: Public Fund Survey, 2009, http://www.publicfundsurvey.org 
(accessed January 8, 2009).  Most but not all data are for FY 2007.
* Th e assets available to pay promised pension beneﬁ ts to retirees consist of contributions from employers and employees (which are relatively predict-
able) plus investment returns on these assets minus plan expenses.  As a pension plan matures, the proportion of its annual income that comes from 
investment returns becomes larger relative to the annual contributions made on behalf of plan members.  Th us assumptions about investment returns 
have an increasing impact on calculations about the plan’s ability to meet its obligations.
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Figure 9—Assumed nominal rate of investment returns in teacher pension plans
Source:  Public Fund Survey, 2009, http://www.publicfundsurvey.org (accessed January 8, 2009). Th e majority of plans 
reported these data as of 2007.
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subsequently be reduced.*  In some cases, state consti-
tutional provisions on contracts have been interpreted 
to protect the beneﬁ ts that a teacher has accrued, but 
not to prohibit changes going forward.  (Th is is the 
standard that the federal government uses for its own 
employee pension plans.)  
A few states cling to an older approach to pensions 
which views them as gratuities that the state can 
modify at any time.  A handful of others take a 
property-rights rather than a contract approach to 
determining the legal protections for pensions, and 
one state operates under a court interpretation based 
on “promissory estoppel” rather than conventional 
contract analysis.
Th is complicated legal structure governing teacher 
pension plans is further explained in a path-breaking 
new analysis by law professor Amy Monahan.81
Legal restrictions explain why some states have ap-
proached pension plan reform by imposing higher 
required contribution levels or less-generous early 
retirement rules on employees hired after a certain 
date and allowing employees hired before that date 
to continue under the old arrangements.  Th is has 
resulted either in public pension plans with “tiers” of 
contribution requirements and/or beneﬁ ts, depending 
on when employees were hired, or in the existence of 
separate plans for earlier and later hires. 
Some states have found it possible, both legally 
and politically, to make pension changes that aﬀ ect 
current employees (while protecting accrued ben-
eﬁ ts).  
Texas, one of the states still viewing pensions as gra-
tuities, changed its teacher retirement system in 2005.  
Teachers who were already 50 years old, whose age and 
years of service equaled at least 70, or who had at least 
25 years of service credit were grandfathered into the 
old rule.  For other teachers, the number of years to be 
used in calculating ﬁ nal average salary was increased 
from three to ﬁ ve and subsidized early retirement was 
largely eliminated.  Teachers who were hired after the 
eﬀ ective date of the changes will have to be at least 60 
years old and meet the “rule of 80” (i.e., age plus years of 
service) to be eligible for unreduced beneﬁ ts.  
* In some states, teachers may not become participants in the pension plan until they have been on the job for a speciﬁ ed period, e.g., one year.  At this 
time they and their employer begin making pension contributions.  Th e teacher is not eligible to receive beneﬁ ts, however, until she has satisﬁ ed the plan’s 
vesting requirement, which requires three to ten years of service.
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In Rhode Island, where employers currently contribute 
almost 20 percent of salary and teachers 9.5 percent 
to the pension plan, in addition to Social Security taxes, 
a Special House Commission to Study All Aspects 
of the State Pension and Retirement System recom-
mended a variety of pension changes to the full House 
of Representatives that would aﬀ ect current workers.  
Th e Commission voted to establish age 65 as the 
normal retirement age for teachers and other state em-
ployees except those already eligible to retire, to reduce 
cost-of-living payments, and to use ﬁ ve rather than 
three years in calculating ﬁ nal average salaries.  Th e 
commission  also recommended placing new employees 
in a hybrid plan combining a DB and a DC component 
and establishing a Standing House Pension Committee 
to provide ongoing review of this important element 
in the state budget.  Th e legislature did not adopt all 
the recommendations but did raise the retirement age 
(to a “target” of 62) and changed the calculation of ﬁ nal 
average salaries, among other things.
Th ese examples suggest that policy makers may have 
more ﬂ exibility than they generally believe to con-
sider pension changes.  We recommend that policy 
makers in each state review carefully the legal limita-
tions on their pension plans and consider whether 
statutory or even constitutional changes would 
provide appropriate ﬂ exibility to alter pension ar-
rangements to address changing circumstances while 
oﬀ ering appropriate protections to plan participants. 
Monahan has suggested that states would be well 
served by adopting the federal standard of guaranteeing 
only accrued beneﬁ ts.
Conclusions
Retirement beneﬁ ts for teachers are mostly provided 
through state-wide pension plans.  Th ese plans need 
to serve the interests of school districts facing diverse 
human capital challenges and of teachers whose careers 
might assume a variety of patterns.  
Th e dominant pension structure, a ﬁ nal-average-salary 
deﬁ ned beneﬁ t plan, is not well-designed to address the 
diﬀ ering circumstances of employers and employees.   
Th ese DB plans encourage early retirements and 
create incentives for retirement at speciﬁ c career points 
that may be unconnected to school needs.  Th ey also 
provide incentives for a teacher to hold onto her job 
until various pension thresholds are reached, regardless 
of whether or not the teacher still enjoys her job and 
is eﬀ ective at it.  Final-average-salary plans penalize 
mobile teachers and those who might choose to work 
in teaching for less than a full career.  In some states, 
the pension promises that have been made to teach-
ers may be overly generous given both economic and 
political realities.
Current teacher pension plans reﬂ ect an approach to 
retirement beneﬁ ts designed mainly to reward career 
workers for long service to the public.  Th is approach 
appears increasingly ineﬃ  cient for addressing the 
human capital challenges facing American schools in 
the 21st century.  Stakeholders in each state need to 
assess their current pension plans and consider pension 
reforms with these challenges in mind.
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For teacher compensation reforms to take root and 
grow, it is crucial that policy makers pay attention to 
what we call “enabling conditions.”  Th ese are the tools, 
policies, and practices without which new compensa-
tion policies will be less eﬀ ective than they should be 
at encouraging genuine instructional improvement and 
increased student learning.
Improved Teacher Evaluation and Professional 
Development Systems
Moving away from the single salary system to reward 
teachers more directly for the quality of their instruc-
tion and the achievement of their students depends 
crucially on the availability of eﬀ ective evaluation and 
professional development systems.  Th ere is widespread 
agreement that both are currently inadequate.
Teacher Evaluations
One recent report on teacher evaluation described 
systems in use throughout public education “that are 
superﬁ cial, capricious, and often don’t even directly 
address the quality of instruction, much less measure 
students’ learning.”82  Teacher evaluation is notorious 
for its "drive-by" nature, with evaluators, frequently 
administrators who are often untrained, making a 
ﬂ eeting classroom visit using a checklist of classroom 
conditions and teacher behaviors that have little to 
do with the quality of instruction.  Evaluators seldom 
rate teachers as “unsatisfactory” and often do not 
discuss their ﬁ ndings with teachers.
Teachers know that the typical evaluation system is 
not a meaningful measure of their performance.  Th eir 
skepticism about evaluation results helps explain 
the failure of “merit-pay” plans in the 1980s, which 
depended heavily on qualitative indicators.  Veteran 
teachers, in particular, continue to oppose using evalua-
tions for high-stakes purposes.  
Perhaps reﬂ ecting the fact that evaluations are generally 
pro-forma rather than meaningful exercises, evaluations 
are undertaken fairly infrequently.  Th is is particularly 
true for tenured teachers, who in 43 states receive this 
guarantee of employment security after three or fewer 
years on the job.83  A report on state teacher evaluation 
requirements in 38 states in 2005 found that just 17 
states required tenured teachers to be evaluated at least 
once a year, with three states requiring biennial evalu-
ations and ﬁ ve requiring triennial evaluations.84  Most 
of the remaining 13 states had no policy on evaluations. 
Districts may or may not have local policies that call for 
more frequent reviews.
Th e poor quality of teacher evaluation systems has 
been an obstacle to some current eﬀ orts to reform com-
pensation.  In 2008 the state school superintendent and 
the governor of Idaho tried to create a performance-pay 
plan.  It failed in the legislature in part because of 
concerns that districts did not have a consistent basis 
for evaluating eﬀ ective teaching.  Subsequently the 
state set up a task force to make recommendations 
about standards to be used in district-based evaluation 
plans.85
Fortunately, attention to the problem of poor teacher 
evaluation is growing.  Charlotte Danielson has 
developed a comprehensive “Framework for Teaching,” 
which has been adopted as the basis for comprehensive 
evaluation systems for initiatives such as the Teacher 
Advancement Program and some local programs.  
Researchers at the University of Virginia have de-
veloped the Classroom Assessment Scoring System 
(CLASS) for evaluating teachers of early grades.  Th e 
National Board for Professional Teaching Standards 
confers certiﬁ cation of teachers from anywhere in the 
country who choose to be evaluated in accordance 
with the Board’s standards in individual subject areas.  
Connecticut’s Beginning Educator Support and 
Training Program (BEST) and the Peer Assistance 
and Review (PAR) program, created jointly by Toledo 
schools and the teacher union and now used in several 
Ohio districts, provide models for evaluating teachers 
early in their careers.86
CHAPTER 4:  Enabling Conditions
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Technical assistance centers such as the Center for 
Educator Compensation Reform and the National 
Comprehensive Center on Teacher Quality draw on 
the knowledge being gained from these pioneering 
eﬀ orts to help states and districts improve teacher 
evaluation.  Standards are emerging to help guide the 
development of eﬀ ective evaluation systems, as shown 
in Figure 10.  Such standards can help address teachers’ 
legitimate concerns about the potential for bias and 
favoritism in poorly designed evaluations.
Professional Development
It would be unfair to hold teachers accountable for 
their performance without providing them with the 
tools to make necessary improvements.  So-called 
“professional development” represents the chief instru-
ment that school districts have for supporting on-the-
job improvement.  Almost all teachers report that they 
spend time in any given school year on professional 
development activities.  States and school districts 
either require participation or create incentives for 
teachers to participate.  
Nevertheless, the author of a synthesis of research on 
professional development describes it as “a hodgepodge 
of providers, formats, philosophies, and content.”87  Too 
much of it takes the form of fragmentary one-day 
workshops that are insuﬃ  ciently intense or focused 
on meaningful instructional improvement.
Districts are estimated to devote between 1 and 6 
percent of their expenditures on teacher professional 
development, with many in the 3 percent range.88  Th is 
money needs to be better spent.  
Research has shown that professional development can 
aﬀ ect what teachers know and do.  Studies have shown 
that professional development can be eﬀ ective when:
• It engages teachers intensively; one-day workshops 
are in most cases “unhelpful” but two-to-four week 
summer institutes make a diﬀ erence.
• It “focuses on subject-matter-speciﬁ c instruction 
and student learning”…that is, “teachers’ learning 
opportunities should be grounded in the work they 
do in classrooms.”
• It is “aligned with and support[s] the instructional 
goals, school improvement eﬀ orts, and curriculum 
materials in teachers’ schools.”
• It emphasizes “collective participation of entire 
schools and ‘active’ learning, such as reviewing 
student work, giving presentations, and planning 
lessons.”89
Professional development must become more eﬀ ective 
across the board rather than in just a few exemplary 
schools or districts.  Materials intended for wide use 
need to be developed and rigorously evaluated on the 
Figure 10—Recommendations for evaluation system designers
Th e Center for Educator Compensation Reform recommends the following practices for designers of teacher 
evaluation systems that involve observations of classroom performance as a basis for educator compensation.
• Use relatively detailed rating scales (“rubrics”) that deﬁ ne a set of levels for each performance dimension. 
• Specify what counts as evidence for performance and how it is to be collected, in a performance measure-
ment handbook or manual. 
• Use an analytic assessment process that separates observation, interpretation, and judgment. Use multiple 
evaluators. 
• Train evaluators for consistency.
• Monitor evaluators’ performance and hold evaluators accountable for doing a good job.
Source:  Anthony T. Milanowski, Cynthia D. Prince, and Julia Koppich, Observations of Teachers’ Classroom Performance (Washington DC:  
Center for Educator Compensation Reform, U.S. Department of Education, Oﬃ  ce of Elementary and Secondary Education, 2007), p. 5-10.
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basis of whether student learning improves, something 
that seldom happens now.  Districts can make more 
extensive use of so-called “formative assessment” of 
students as well as the “summative assessment” used 
in accountability programs.  Formative assessment, 
which gauges student knowledge throughout the 
year, is intended to inform teachers about whether 
students are making progress in developing the skills 
and knowledge that will be measured on “the tests that 
count.”  Students failing to make suﬃ  cient progress 
can be identiﬁ ed for further assistance.  Formative 
assessment data can also be used to help teachers shore 
up their skills in areas where their instruction appears 
ineﬀ ective.
Improved Student and Teacher Data Systems
Using student performance to help determine teacher 
compensation, whether that performance is measured 
quantitatively or qualitatively, will require much better 
data systems than currently exist in many states and 
school districts.
In their work with school districts attempting to 
implement performance-pay systems linked to teach-
ers’ success in improving student outcomes, Daniel 
McCaﬀ rey and his colleagues have discovered that the 
initial step, creating accurate data bases that can link 
information on students and teachers, involves chal-
lenges that are often overlooked and underestimated.  
Administrative data, historically collected to satisfy 
reporting requirements, need much processing 
before they can be used to generate student perfor-
mance measures.  Teacher data and student data have 
to be linked.  Th e teachers for whom student outcome 
measures are available have to be identiﬁ ed.  Accurate 
decisions have to be made about which students 
to count ( just those in a teacher’s classroom for a 
certain number of months?) and about how to deal 
with students who have multiple teachers in the same 
subject.  Teachers who teach multiple subjects or grades 
have to be appropriately classiﬁ ed.90  Real-time feed-
back, especially on formative assessments, is essential 
to enabling teachers to adapt their instruction to their 
students’ academic strengths and weaknesses. 
Administrative data systems, even good ones, are not 
set up to easily make these distinctions and linkages 
or to provide the kind of accurate statistics needed 
when compensation is at stake.  Typically, student 
information systems, human resource systems (includ-
ing payroll), and assessment systems have existed in 
independent data silos.  Th ere has often been limited 
interoperability among these silos.  Frequently the data 
in them are inconsistent.  Many school districts still 
lack the underlying electronic records or record-linking 
capability and the technical staﬀ  to tackle these chal-
lenges.
Statewide data systems can ease some of the burden on 
local districts, by, for example, providing districts with 
student test records that can be matched from year to 
year using a statewide student identiﬁ er.  Since 2005 
the Data Quality Campaign91 has worked to encourage 
the development of statewide longitudinal data systems 
that can track student progress over time.  Th e DQC 
reports “remarkable progress” between 2005 and 2008, 
with six states (as opposed to none in 2005) having all 
ten of the “essential elements” that a system must have 
to build a highly eﬀ ective longitudinal system.  Forty-
eight states now have ﬁ ve or more of the elements.92   
Developing longitudinal data on teachers is progressing 
more slowly, however.  Fewer than half the states have 
teacher identiﬁ er systems with the ability to match 
teachers to students.  Such matching is actively resisted 
in some states.  Th e California Teachers Association 
long opposed the creation of a statewide teacher data 
base and the linkage of student and teacher data.  It 
backed away from this only when it was able to get 
language added to the authorizing statute for the 
California Longitudinal Teacher Integrated Data 
Education System that forbids the use of the teacher 
data for evaluation or pay purposes.93
Committing ﬁ scal and human resources to data base 
development is often a “hard sell” politically, especially 
in hard economic times.  Th e progress that has been 
made so far in building good state and local data 
systems must, however, be sustained and accelerated. 
Th is will be necessary not only to enable compensation 
reforms but to foster the development of many types of 
information (e.g., identifying eﬀ ective school curricula 
and teacher training programs) that are essential to 
improving student learning.
Sustainable Funding
Reforming teacher compensation will almost certainly 
require additional funding, at least in the short-to-
medium term.  Business leaders who support reform 
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must be prepared to become advocates for that funding. 
Too often in the past, eﬀ orts to reform compensation 
have faltered in part because funding was not avail-
able to sustain new pay arrangements.  Th is was a 
major problem with the “merit pay” plans in the 1980s 
and continues to be an issue with more recent eﬀ orts.
Even if the single salary schedule is replaced (as in 
Denver) by a plan that doesn’t base teacher pay rigidly 
on years of service and formal credentials, it will not 
be feasible to pay for new forms of compensation by 
reducing pay for existing teachers.  So pay for perfor-
mance, pay for new career pathways, and labor-market-
based pay require new resources.
Often compensation reforms are funded initially by 
outside groups on a one-time basis.  Many current 
compensation initiatives are being paid for with sig-
niﬁ cant support from the federal government (through 
the Department of Education’s Teacher Incentive Fund 
program—TIF), from state governments through grant 
programs, and from foundations.  In many cases it is 
clear that the outside funding will disappear after a few 
years (TIF grants, for example, are ﬁ ve-year grants) and 
that school districts will have to pick up the costs after 
that time.  Q-Comp in Minnesota is structured as a 
so-called categorical program within the state general 
revenue budget for education, not as a grant program, 
with the intention that it would be a permanent state 
commitment.*  Denver sought and won a special tax 
levy to support ProComp after the pilot period was 
over.  Such attention to sustainability is unusual, 
however.  
Th e ﬁ nancial challenge is not only one of ﬁ nding per-
manent funding but also of estimating accurately what 
the cost of reforms will be.  An implementation guide 
on sustaining pay reform from the Center for Educator 
Compensation Reform points out that 
…states and districts too often fail to estimate costs 
accurately, or they skip this crucial step altogether.  
School systems that underestimate potential 
personnel costs or miscalculate ﬁ scal exposure risk 
serious ﬁ nancial losses, and possibly legal action 
and penalties, as well as loss of credibility among 
teachers and the public.94
Th e guide notes that performance pay in particular 
is challenging, because at least until some experience 
is gained it can be diﬃ  cult to estimate how many 
teachers and schools will quality for awards.  Finding 
the funds for performance awards in education if 
performance is better than predicted is not as simple as 
in the private sector, where the improved performance 
underlying personnel awards also presumably generates 
more revenue for the ﬁ rm.  States and districts have 
sometimes responded to the challenge of better-than-
expected performance by increasing the performance-
pay budget, but too often they have instead reduced the 
award levels to stretch the original budget or changed 
the qualiﬁ cation requirement so that fewer teachers or 
schools qualify.  In one particularly egregious example, 
a Florida school district in the now-discontinued 
STAR program found that it had insuﬃ  cient state 
funds to pay promised awards because some teachers 
had tied for rewards.  Th e district resorted to a lottery 
to decide which teachers who tied would receive the 
award, essentially reducing performance pay to a game 
of chance for these teachers. 
Th e costs of bonus and incentive payments are not the 
only ﬁ nancial commitments districts must be prepared 
to meet as they consider compensation reform.  We 
have already noted the need for improved evaluation, 
professional development, and data systems.  New pay 
systems may also entail higher employer contributions 
to teacher pension plans and higher employment taxes.  
Districts sometimes forget to factor these payments 
into their new pay plans.  
In the long term there should be savings from a 
more eﬃ  cient compensation system that could help 
sustain reforms.  A great deal of money is currently 
spent under the single-salary schedule to reward 
teachers for advanced academic credentials that have 
not proven to be related to student learning.  Clearly 
this money can be better spent.  Correcting the distor-
tions and inequities in pension plans would over time 
be easier if early retirement incentives were reduced, 
normal retirement ages were raised, and employer in-
vestment risks were circumscribed through something 
like a cash-balance plan.
* Of course, current legislators cannot bind their successors, and programs can always be amended or eliminated.   
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Supportive State and Federal Policies
States and the federal government have important roles 
to play in encouraging teacher compensation reforms.  
Th ese range from providing ﬁ nancial incentives and 
technical assistance in support of new forms of pay to 
removing obstacles to revising and adequately funding 
pay plans.
Encouraging New Forms of Pay
We have already cited a number of instances where 
state governments have acted to encourage districts 
to adopt pay reforms.  Mostly these have related 
to performance- and labor-market-based pay.  Th e 
National Center for Teacher Quality’s 2008 State 
Teacher Policy Yearbook says that 22 states provide 
incentives in the form of diﬀ erential pay for teachers 
who teach in high-needs schools, and 20 support 
diﬀ erential pay for shortage subject areas.  A number 
of states supplement the pay of teachers who earn 
National Board for Professional Teaching Standards 
certiﬁ cation.  It appears to be the exception rather than 
the rule, however, that these supplements are directed 
toward teachers who also agree to teach in high-needs 
schools.95
In addition to providing ﬁ nancial incentives to encour-
age new forms of pay, states may be able to make 
it easier for districts to innovate by giving districts 
explicit authority to create diﬀ erential pay plans.  In the 
40-some states where teachers have collective bargain-
ing rights, wages are generally subject to mandatory 
bargaining at the local level.  It is not always clear, 
given diﬀ erences in state laws, whether certain kinds of 
diﬀ erential pay such as bonuses and incentive pay-
ments are to be considered wages or not.  States could 
provide districts with explicit authorization to establish 
diﬀ erential pay without resort to collective bargaining; 
without such authorization each district must decide 
for itself whether a local decision to establish a dif-
ferential pay plan must be negotiated with the union.  
Except in Florida and Hawaii, where the state constitu-
tion requires collective bargaining, states are free to 
modify statutes about the issues subject to mandatory 
negotiation.96  For reasons to be discussed in the next 
section, districts are likely to want teachers involved 
in developing new pay plans, so policy makers in each 
state will want to consider whether the extra grant of 
authority is needed or not to enable pay reforms to take 
place.
Florida has been the pacesetter for states working to 
develop longitudinal student and teacher data bases to 
support both accountability and instructional improve-
ment.  Over 30 years the state has developed a com-
prehensive kindergarten-through-graduate-school data 
system that can follow students through public schools, 
community colleges, career and technical education, 
adult education, and the state university system and 
can even follow some into the workforce. Longitudinal 
information from separate data systems are increasingly 
linked through an education data warehouse, and data 
analyses likely to be of wide interest are made available 
through data marts.  Th e data warehouse is student-
centric but links student information to information 
on students, staﬀ , educational institutions, curriculum, 
courses taken, facilities, and ﬁ nance.  Th rough a 
partnership with the Microsoft Corporation, Florida is 
currently developing Sunshine Connections, composed 
of resources and tools aimed at teachers.  All teachers 
are to be provided with desktop, immediate access to 
classroom management tools, student performance 
data, instructional strategies, tools for collaboration 
and communication with other teachers, curricular 
materials, and personalized professional develop-
ment opportunities. A public area on the Sunshine 
Connections website gives all users a series of free tools 
organized by area of interest.  A restricted area provides 
teachers with conﬁ dential tools and information 
speciﬁ c to their own students.
Th e federal government is helping states and districts 
develop better data systems and try new forms of pay.  
Th e Department of Education has several initiatives 
underway, including:
• Th e Teacher Incentive Fund (TIF).  Under TIF, 
school districts, charter schools that have the status 
of school districts within their state, and state 
education agencies, either alone or in partnership 
with nonproﬁ t organizations, can apply for funds 
to develop and implement performance-based 
teacher and principal compensation systems in 
high-need schools.  Th irty-four awards for multi-
year funding were made in 2007, and more will be 
coming.  Th e department also funded the Center 
for Educator Compensation Reform to provide 
technical assistance to TIF sites.
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• Research and technical assistance centers.  Under 
its National Research and Development Centers 
program, the department awarded a ﬁ ve-year, $10 
million grant to Vanderbilt University to study 
performance incentives systems and to establish 
pay-for-performance experiments.  As noted 
earlier, the department also supports technical 
assistance through the National Comprehensive 
Center on Teacher Quality.
• State Longitudinal Data Systems Grant 
Program.   Beginning with 14 initial grantees in 
2005, the department has now awarded grants to 
all but six states* to help them develop data systems 
to inform decisions and research aimed at improv-
ing student learning.
• Teacher Education Assistance for College and 
Higher Education (TEACH).  Awarded for 
the ﬁ rst time for school year 2008-09, TEACH 
grants of up to $4,000 per year are available to 
college students who agree to teach for at least 
four academic years in public or private schools 
serving low-income families.  If a grant recipient 
fails to fulﬁ ll the teaching commitment, the grant is 
converted to a loan.
Th e economic stimulus bill passed by Congress in 
early 2009 will help states and districts address several 
of the “enabling conditions” outlined in this chapter.  
Among the priorities the Department of Education has 
outlined for the nearly  $100 billion allocated for K-12 
education over two years are fair and reliable teacher-
evaluation systems based on objective measures of 
student progress and multiple teacher observations and 
training for educators to use data to improve student 
instruction.97  
State and federal encouragement of pay reforms will 
be more eﬀ ective the more policy makers recognize 
that redesigning teacher compensation is very much 
a work in progress, with a great deal still to be 
learned.   Th ey can support the continuous improve-
ment process by encouraging experimentation, evalu-
ation, and program modiﬁ cations as more experience 
is gained and more evidence accumulated about what 
works and what doesn’t.
Removing Obstacles
Financial incentives and technical assistance will not 
be enough to foster signiﬁ cant changes in teacher 
compensation systems unless states also rid their 
often-voluminous education codes of laws and policies 
that protect existing pay arrangements or that stand in 
the way of responsible ﬁ scal administration of teacher 
pension plans.
A few examples will suggest some of the policy 
provisions that currently obstruct reform.  Moving 
away from reliance on the single salary schedule may 
be diﬃ  cult for districts in the 17 states that have 
minimum salary schedules for teachers.  Even though 
the salary levels in the schedules may be lower that 
those actually used in most or all of the districts in the 
state, the existence of a statewide requirement and the 
way that it is speciﬁ ed may force districts to adhere to 
a “steps and lanes” structure for current pay.  Rhode 
Island does not have a state salary schedule but requires 
local districts to have salary schedules that are based 
on years of service, experience and training.  Rhode 
Island and 17 other states require districts to pay more 
to teachers who have earned advanced degrees. 98  Th e 
NEA aﬃ  liate in Missouri won a court order in 2004 
blocking bonuses a local district wanted to oﬀ er to 
some teachers who agreed to sign two-year instead of 
annual contracts.  Th e court ruled that the bonuses 
violated the Missouri Teacher Tenure Act that required 
a school board to approve a salary schedule for all 
teachers.99
We have already noted California’s statutory prohibi-
tion against using teacher data from its statewide 
teacher longitudinal data base for purposes of teacher 
pay or evaluation.  New York teacher unions were suc-
cessful in 2008 in persuading the legislature to impose 
a ban for at least two years on using student perfor-
mance as a criterion in awarding teacher tenure.  (Th ese 
provisions may be changed as states work to meet the 
eligibility requirements for new federal funding under 
the economic stimulus program.)
State requirements can also interfere with ﬁ scal respon-
sibility in pension plans.  According to the Center for 
Retirement Research at Boston College, in 2006 19 
* Alabama, New Mexico, Oklahoma, South Dakota, West Virginia, and Wyoming.
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teacher pension plans operated under statutory con-
straints on employer contributions that prevented them 
from making their Actuarial Required Contributions 
(ARC).  Employers in Illinois made only 36 percent of 
the ARC; 11 other teacher plans received less than 80 
percent of their ARCs from employers.100
Wide Stakeholder Involvement
Finally, but by no means least important, a clear lesson 
that emerges from both successful and unsuccessful 
eﬀ orts to reform teacher compensation is the impor-
tance of engaging a wide group of stakeholders in 
the design and implementation of new compensation 
plans.  
Teachers are essential partners for both legal and 
practical reasons.  In many states that authorize teacher 
collective bargaining, wages are subject to negotiation 
between school boards and unions.  Even where they 
are not, teachers who oppose pay reforms may well 
have enough political clout to defeat them by voting 
against school board supporters.  Plans imposed on 
teachers without their input may not have the desired 
eﬀ ects on teacher behavior.  Despite this fairly obvious 
point about teacher engagement, we saw in Chapter 
2 some examples (and there are numerous others) of 
how compensation reform eﬀ orts went astray in part 
because state or district policy makers failed to involve 
teachers in design and implementation.
Other stakeholders ought to be at the table as well, 
however.  Th e interests of teachers (often represented 
by unions that are heavily inﬂ uenced by their longest-
serving members) are not necessarily the same as those 
of other policy makers and taxpayers, for reasons 
presented throughout in this study.  Th ese other 
stakeholders represent important viewpoints in a 
public system that ought also to be heard.
Moreover, the support of many people will be needed 
for new approaches to compensation to work.  
Administrators will have to revise their systems for 
such things as evaluation and payroll.  School boards 
and/or state legislatures can provide crucial funding 
and can alter existing policies and practices that may 
pose roadblocks to new pay arrangements.  Mayors and 
governors can spur policy design and rally support for 
change.  Business leaders can contribute their experi-
ence with various approaches to compensation design 
in the private sector.   Foundations are often needed 
to help fund the design, initial implementation, and 
evaluation of new pay initiatives.
Public education in the United States operates in a 
messy and fragmented political environment.  It can 
be frustrating to take the time to engage with all the 
constituencies that legitimately have a voice in educa-
tion policy.   Th ere is a danger that procedures for 
appropriate consultation and wide engagement can be 
used by supporters of the status quo to keep on with 
business as usual.  Informed, forceful supporters of 
reform must continue to press for improvements in 
teacher compensation systems, while ensuring that 
important perspectives and concerns receive appro-
priate consideration as new approaches are designed 
and implemented. 
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Memoranda of Comment, Reservation or Dissent
Page 9, Landon H. Rowland
We must also consider the following additional “demo-
graphic” aspects of life in any urban school environ-
ment:
1. Th e steady expansion and prevalence of students 
receiving free and reduced-priced lunches—the 
principal marker for indigence.
2. Th e increase in the number of languages and 
language dialects spoken by families of children 
in urban districts (for example, the third largest 
language group in one district is Somali).
3. High turnover of students from the beginning of 
the school year to the following spring—sometimes 
exceeding half of the student body.
4. Th e increase and prevalence of homeless families 
(and homeless children in junior high and high 
school).
Th e persistence of these demographic conditions 
frustrates the best teachers and principals and prevents 
the best education reforms from being eﬀ ective.  People 
in high oﬃ  ce adopt solutions involving money and 
bold pronouncements but often do nothing to address 
these demographic conditions and their eﬀ ects on good 
teaching and good learning.
Page 17, Josh Weston
Th e length of the typical teacher’s work day should 
be associated with advocacy for higher pay levels, in 
order to attract more upper quartile college graduates 
into teaching careers, while also enhancing student 
outcomes.
Th e KIPP charter schools are especially acclaimed for 
their superior outcomes, which are partially attribut-
able to their longer school hours.  Most public schools 
adjourn by 3 p.m., with fewer than six teaching hours 
per day.  Adding an hour to the teaching day, accom-
panied by 10-15 percent higher pay levels, would be a 
win-win outcome for students, teachers, and parents.
Page 36, Howard Fluhr
Th e section on pensions is well-balanced and thorough. 
Because confusion about DB and DC plans is rife, I 
hope that readers will give careful attention to all the 
material in this CED report.  Superﬁ cial or selective 
attention to the analysis could potentially result in 
CED’s ﬁ ndings being misused and/or misinterpreted.  
Only a full reading of the pension discussion can 
provide an adequate understanding of the elements of 
choice involved in pension plan design and of how the 
pros and cons depend on the speciﬁ c circumstances of 
individual states and cities.
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CE  Circulo de Empresarios
  Madrid, Spain
CEAL  Consejo Empresario de America Latina
  Buenos Aires, Argentina
CEDA  Committee for Economic Development of Australia
  Sydney, Australia
CIRD  China Institute for Reform and Development
  Hainan, People’s Republic of China
EVA  Centre for Finnish Business and Policy Studies
  Helsinki, Finland
FAE  Forum de Administradores de Empresas
  Lisbon, Portugal
IDEP  Institut de l’Entreprise
  Paris, France
 Keizai Doyukai
  Tokyo, Japan
NBI  National Business Initiative 
  Johannesburg, South Africa
SMO  Stichting Maatschappij en Onderneming 
  Th e Netherlands
CED Counterpart Organizations
Close relations exist between the Committee for Economic Development and independent, nonpolitical research 
organizations in other countries. Such counterpart groups are composed of business executives and scholars and 
have objectives similar to those of CED, which they pursue by similarly objective methods. CED cooperates with 
these organizations on research and study projects of common interest to the various countries concerned. Th is 
program has resulted in a number of joint policy statements involving such international matters as energy, assis-
tance to developing countries, and the reduction of nontariﬀ  barriers to trade.


Committee for
Economic Development
2000 L Street N.W.
Suite 700
Washington, D.C. 20036
202-296-5860 Main Number
202-223-0776 Fax
1-800-676-7353
www.ced.org
